Twitter Inc v Elon Musk
NATURE OF THE ACTION
In April 2022, Elon Musk entered into a binding merger agreement with Twitter, promising to use his best efforts to get the deal done. Now, less than three months later, Musk refuses to honor his obligations to Twitter and its stockholders because the deal he signed no longer serves his personal interests. Having mounted a public spectacle to put Twitter in play, and having proposed and then signed a seller-friendly merger agreement, Musk apparently believes that he unlike every other party subject to Delaware contract law is free to changehis mind, trash the company, disrupt its operations, destroy stockholder value, and
walk away. This repudiation follows a long list of material contractual breaches by Musk that have cast a pall over Twitter and its business. Twitter brings this action to enjoin Musk from further breaches, to compel Musk to fulfill his legal obligations, and to compel consummation of the merger upon satisfaction of the few outstanding conditions. Musk, the Chief Executive Officer of Tesla, Inc. and leader of SpaceXand other entities, opened a Twitter account in 2009. His presence on the Twitterplatform is ubiquitous. With over 100 million followers, Musks account is one of the most followed on Twitter, and he has Tweeted more than 18,000 times. He has also suggested he would consider starting his own company to compete with Twitter.On April 25, 2022, Musk, acting through and with his solely-owned entities, Parent and Acquisition Sub, agreed to buy Twitter for $54.20 per share in cash, for a total of about $44 billion. That price, presented by Musk on a take-it-or-leave-it basis in an unsolicited public offer, represented a 38% premium over Twitters unaffected share price. The other terms Musk offered and agreed to were, as he touted, seller friendly. There is no financing contingency and no diligence condition. The deal is backed by airtight debt and equity commitments.Musk has personally committed $33.5 billion.
After the merger agreement was signed, the market fell. As the Wall Street Journal reported recently, the value of Musks stake in Tesla, the anchor of his personal wealth, has declined by more than $100 billion from its November 2021 peak.So Musk wants out. Rather than bear the cost of the market downturn, as the merger agreement requires, Musk wants to shift it to Twitters stockholders. This is in keeping with the tactics Musk has deployed against Twitter and its stockholders since earlier this year, when he started amassing an undisclosed stake in the company and continued to grow his position without required notification. It tracks the disdain he has shown for the company that one would have expected Musk, as its would-be steward, to protect. Since signing the merger agreement, Musk has repeatedly disparaged Twitter and the deal, creating business risk for Twitter and downward pressure on its share price.Musks exit strategy is a model of hypocrisy. One of the chief reasons Musk cited on March 31, 2022 for wanting to buy Twitter was to rid it of the [c]rypto spam he viewed as a major blight on the user experience. Musk said he needed to take the company private because, according to him, purging spam would otherwise be commercially impractical. In his press release announcing the deal on April 25, 2022, Musk raised a clarion call to defeat[] the spam bots. But when the market declined and the fixed-price deal became less attractive,
Musk shifted his narrative, suddenly demanding verification that spam was not a serious problem on Twitters platform, and claiming a burning need to conduct diligence he had expressly forsworn. Musks strategy is also a model of bad faith. While pretending to exercise the narrow right he has under the merger agreement to information for consummation of the transaction, Musk has been working furiously albeit fruitlessly to try to show that the company he promised to buy and not disparagehas made material misrepresentations about its business to regulators and investors. He has also asserted, falsely, that consummation of the merger depends on the results of his fishing expedition and his ability to secure debt financing. On July 8, 2022, a little over a month after first using bad-faith pursuit of spam-related evidence to assert a baseless claim of breach, Musk gave Twitter notice purporting to terminate the merger agreement. The notice alleges three grounds for termination: (i) purported breach of information-sharing and cooperation covenants; (ii) supposed materially inaccurate representations in the merger agreement that allegedly are reasonably likely to result in a Company Material Adverse Effect; and (iii) purported failure to comply with the ordinary course covenant by terminating certain employees, slowing hiring, and failing to retain key personnel. These claims are pretexts and lack any merit. Twitter has abided by
its covenants, and no Company Material Adverse Effect has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur. Musk, by contrast, has been acting against this deal since the market started turning, and has breached the merger agreement repeatedly in the process. He has purported to put the deal on hold pending satisfaction of imaginary conditions, breached his financing efforts obligations in the process, violated his obligations to treat requests for consent reasonably and to provide information about financing status, violated his non-disparagement obligation, misused confidential information, and otherwise failed to employ required efforts to consummate the acquisition. Twitter is entitled to specific performance of defendants obligations under the merger agreement and to secure for Twitter stockholders the benefit of Musks bargain. Musk and his entities should be enjoined from further breaches, ordered to comply with their obligations to work toward satisfying the few closingconditions, and ordered to close upon satisfaction of those conditions.
TWTR | None | None | None
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IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
TWITTER, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ELON R. MUSK, X HOLDINGS I, INC.,
and X HOLDINGS II, INC.,
Defendants
.
C.A. No. _____________
VERIFIED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Twitter, Inc. (“Twitterâ€), by and through its undersigned counsel, as
and  for  its  complaint  against  defendants  Elon  R.  Musk,  X  Holdings  I,  Inc.
(“Parentâ€), and X Holdings II, Inc. (“Acquisition Subâ€), alleges as follows:
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1.
In  April  2022,  Elon  Musk  entered  into  a  binding  merger  agreement
with Twitter, promising to use his best efforts to get the deal done.  Now, less than
three  months  later,  Musk  refuses  to  honor  his  obligations  to  Twitter  and  its
stockholders  because  the  deal  he  signed  no  longer  serves  his  personal  interests.
Having mounted a public spectacle to put Twitter in play, and having proposed and
then signed a seller-friendly merger agreement, Musk apparently believes that he
— unlike every other party subject to Delaware contract law — is free to change
his mind, trash the company, disrupt its operations, destroy stockholder value, and
EFiled:Â Â Jul 12 2022Â 04:11PM EDT
Transaction ID 67812653
Case No. 2022-0613-
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walk away.  This repudiation follows a long list of material contractual breaches by
Musk that have cast a pall over Twitter and its business.  Twitter brings this action
to  enjoin  Musk  from  further  breaches, to  compel  Musk  to  fulfill  his  legal
obligations,  and  to  compel  consummation  of  the  merger  upon  satisfaction  of  the
few outstanding conditions.
2.
Musk, the Chief Executive Officer of Tesla, Inc. and leader of SpaceX
and other entities, opened a Twitter account in 2009.  His presence on the Twitter
platform is ubiquitous.  With over 100 million followers, Musk’s account is one of
the most followed on Twitter, and he has Tweeted more than 18,000 times.  He has
also  suggested  he  would  consider  starting  his  own  company  to  compete  with
Twitter.
3.
On April 25, 2022, Musk, acting through and with his solely-owned
entities, Parent and Acquisition Sub, agreed to buy Twitter for $54.20 per share in
cash, for a total of about $44 billion.
4.
That  price,  presented  by  Musk  on  a  take-it-or-leave-it  basis in  an
unsolicited  public  offer, represented  a  38% premium  over  Twitter’s  unaffected
share price.  The other terms Musk offered and agreed to were, as he touted, “seller
friendly.â€Â There is no financing contingency and no diligence condition. The deal
is  backed  by  airtight  debt  and  equity  commitments.
Musk  has  personally
committed $33.5 billion.
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5.
After the merger agreement was signed, the market fell.  As the
Wall
Street Journal
reported recently, the value of Musk’s stake in Tesla, the anchor of
his  personal  wealth, has declined  by  more  than  $100  billion  from  its  November
2021 peak.
6.
So  Musk  wants  out.    Rather  than  bear  the  cost of  the  market
downturn,  as  the merger  agreement  requires,  Musk  wants  to  shift  it  to  Twitter’s
stockholders.    This  is  in  keeping  with  the  tactics  Musk  has  deployed  against
Twitter  and  its  stockholders  since  earlier  this  year,  when  he  started  amassing  an
undisclosed  stake  in  the  company  and  continued  to  grow  his  position  without
required notification. It tracks the disdain he has shown for the company that one
would have expected Musk, as its would-be steward, to protect. Since signing the
merger agreement, Musk has repeatedly disparaged Twitter and the deal, creating
business risk for Twitter and downward pressure on its share price.
7.
Musk’s exit strategy is a model of hypocrisy.  One of the chief reasons
Musk  cited  on  March  31,  2022  for  wanting  to  buy Twitter  was  to  rid  it  of  the
“[c]rypto spamâ€Â he viewed as a “major blight on the user experience.â€Â  Musk said
he needed to take the company private because, according to him, purging spam
would otherwise be commercially impractical.  In his press release announcing the
deal  on  April  25,  2022,  Musk  raised  a  clarion  call  to  “defeat[]  the  spam  bots.â€
But when  the  market  declined  and  the fixed-price deal  became  less  attractive,
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Musk shifted his narrative, suddenly demanding “verificationâ€Â that spam was
not
a
serious  problem  on  Twitter’s  platform,  and  claiming  a  burning  need to  conduct
“diligence†he had expressly forsworn.
8.
Musk’s strategy  is  also  a  model  of  bad  faith.    While pretending  to
exercise  the narrow  right  he  has  under  the  merger  agreement  to  information  for
“consummation  of  the  transaction,â€Â Musk  has  been  working  furiously  — albeit
fruitlessly — to try to show that the company he promised to buy and not disparage
has made material misrepresentations about its business to regulators and investors.
He  has  also asserted,  falsely,  that  consummation  of  the  merger  depends  on  the
results of his fishing expedition and his ability to secure debt financing.
9.
On July 8, 2022, a little over a month after first using bad-faith pursuit
of spam-related evidence to assert a baseless claim of breach, Musk gave Twitter
notice  purporting  to  terminate  the  merger  agreement.    The  notice  alleges  three
grounds  for  termination:  (i) purported  breach  of  information-sharing  and
cooperation covenants; (ii) supposed “materially inaccurate representationsâ€Â in the
merger  agreement  that  allegedly  are  “reasonably  likely  to  result  inâ€Â a  Company
Material  Adverse  Effect;  and  (iii)  purported  failure  to  comply  with  the  ordinary
course  covenant  by  terminating  certain  employees,  slowing  hiring,  and  failing  to
retain key personnel.
10.
These claims are pretexts and lack any merit.  Twitter has abided by
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its  covenants,  and  no  Company Material  Adverse  Effect has  occurred or  is
reasonably  likely to  occur.  Musk,  by  contrast,  has  been  acting  against this  deal
since the market started turning, and has breached the merger agreement repeatedly
in the process.  He has purported to put the deal on “holdâ€Â pending satisfaction of
imaginary  conditions,  breached  his  financing efforts obligations  in  the  process,
violated his  obligations to  treat  requests  for  consent  reasonably and  to  provide
information  about  financing  status,  violated  his non-disparagement  obligation,
misused confidential information, and otherwise failed to employ required efforts
to consummate the acquisition.
11.
Twitter is entitled to specific performance of defendants’ obligations
under the merger agreement and to secure for Twitter stockholders the benefit of
Musk’s bargain. Musk and his entities should be enjoined from further breaches,
ordered to comply with their obligations to work toward satisfying the few closing
conditions, and ordered to close upon satisfaction of those conditions.
THE PARTIES
12.
Plaintiff  Twitter,  Inc. is  a  Delaware  corporation  headquartered  in
San Francisco,  California that owns  and  operates  a  global  platform  for  real-time
self-expression and conversation.
13.
Defendant  Elon  R.  Musk is  a  sophisticated  entrepreneur who  owns
approximately 9.6% of Twitter’s stock.  He is the CEO of Tesla and leads SpaceX,
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among other entities he founded or co-founded.  Musk is referred to in the merger
agreement as Equity Investor, and is the President, Secretary, Treasurer, and sole
shareholder of  both  Parent  and  Acquisition  Sub.
Musk  signed  the  merger
agreement on behalf of both Parent and Acquisition Sub, and agreed to be a party
to  the  agreement  in  his  individual  capacity  as  Equity  Investor  with  respect  to
several “Specified Provisions.† Ex. 1, Preamble.
14.
Defendant  X  Holdings  I,  Inc., or  Parent, is  a  Delaware  corporation
formed  on  April  19,  2022  solely  for  the  purpose  of  engaging  in,  and  arranging
financing for, the transactions contemplated by the merger agreement.
15.
Defendant  X  Holdings  II,  Inc., or  Acquisition  Sub, is  a  Delaware
corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of Parent.  Acquisition Sub was formed
on April 19, 2022 solely for the purpose of engaging in, and arranging financing
for, the transactions contemplated by the merger agreement.
JURISDICTION
16.
This  Court  has  subject  matter  jurisdiction  under 10
Del.  C.
§ 341,
8
Del. C.
§ 111(a), and 6
Del. C
. § 2708.
17.
Personal  jurisdiction  over  Parent  and  Acquisition  Sub  is  proper
because  both  are  incorporated  under  the  laws  of  Delaware  and  consented  to
jurisdiction  by  agreeing  to  “expressly  and  irrevocably  submit[]  to  the  exclusive
personal  jurisdiction  of  the  Delaware  Court  of  Chancery  . . .  in  the  event  any
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dispute  arises out of [the  merger agreement] or the  transactions  contemplated by
[the merger agreement].â€Â Ex. 1 § 9.10(a).
18.
Personal  jurisdiction  over  Musk  is  proper  pursuant  to  10
Del.  C.
§ 3104(c)(1) because, among other things, (a) Musk formed Parent and Acquisition
Sub, both Delaware corporations wholly owned by Musk, for the sole purpose of
acquiring  Twitter,  a  Delaware  corporation;  and  (b)  Musk  agreed  to  undertake
“reasonable  best  effortsâ€Â to  consummate  the  contemplated  transaction,  including
by  causing  Parent  and  Acquisition  Sub  to  deliver  a  Certificate  of  Merger  to  the
Delaware Secretary of State.
Id.
§§ 2.3(a), 6.3(a).
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
I.
Musk sets his sights on Twitter
19.
Musk is active on Twitter’s platform and has expressed a keen interest
in the use and inherent potential of the platform.  Starting in January 2022, Musk
began purchasing Twitter stock.  By March 14, 2022, he had secretly accumulated
a  substantial  position — about  5%  of  the  company’s  outstanding  shares.    SEC
regulations  required  that  he  disclose  that  position  no  later  than  March  24,  2022.
Musk failed to disclose, and instead kept amassing Twitter stock with the market
none  the  wiser.    By  April  1,  2022,  Musk had  accumulated  about  9.1%  of  the
company’s  outstanding  shares,  still  in  secret.    Not  until April  4,  2022 did  Musk
finally  disclose  his  holdings,  which  made  him  Twitter’s  largest  stockholder.
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Twitter’s  stock  price  jumped  27% upon  the  disclosure.    Between  March  24  and
April 4, over 112 million Twitter shares traded in ignorance of Musk’s mounting
ownership.
20.
Meanwhile,  on  March  26,  2022,  Musk  spoke  with  two Twitter
directors, Jack Dorsey and Egon Durban, about the future of social media and the
prospect of Musk’s joining the Twitter board.  Soon after, Musk told Twitter CEO
Parag  Agrawal and  Twitter  board  chair  Bret  Taylor that  he had  in  mind  three
options  relative  to  Twitter:  join  its  board,  take  the  company  private,  or  start  a
competitor.
21.
Musk  would  repeat  this  statement  over  the  coming  days.    His
contemplation of building a rival platform to Twitter was not a secret.  On March
26, 2022, he had Tweeted that he was giving “serious thought†to the idea.
22.
In early April, after further discussion among Musk, Agrawal, Taylor,
and Twitter director Martha Lane Fox, chair of Twitter’s nominating and corporate
governance  committee, the  Twitter  board  evaluated Musk’s  candidacy  as  a
director.  Having considered, among other things, Musk’s interest in the platform,
his  technical  expertise,  and  the  perspectives  he  could  bring,  the  board  offered
Musk  the  position  on  April  3.    Musk accepted,  the  parties  signed  a  letter
agreement, and the agreement was announced on April 5.
23.
Not a week later, Musk abruptly changed tack.  On April 9, the day
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his appointment to the board was to become effective, Musk told Twitter he would
not join the board.  Instead, he would offer to buy the company.
II.
Musk offers to buy Twitter
24.
On April 13 — four days after reversing course on the board seat —
Musk texted Taylor that he planned to make an offer to acquire all of Twitter.  His
unsolicited offer, conveyed by letter later that day, was accompanied by a threat:
I  am  offering  to  buy  100%  of  Twitter  for  $54.20  per
share  in  cash,  a  54%  premium  over  the  day  before  I
began investing in Twitter and a 38% premium over the
day before my investment was publicly announced.  My
offer is my best and final offer and if it is not accepted, I
would need to reconsider my position as a shareholder.
25.
The  following  day,  on  April  14,  Musk announced  his  offer  publicly
and  noted  that  it  was  conditioned  on  customary  business  due  diligence  and
financing.    At  a  public event  the  same  day,  Musk  — whose  enormous  personal
wealth  exceeds  the  capital  of  most public  companies  — boasted that  he  could
“technically afford†to purchase Twitter outright.
26.
Also on April 14, the Twitter board met to discuss Musk’s proposal.
It established a transactions committee composed of independent directors Taylor,
Lane Fox, and Patrick Pichette to evaluate the proposal, oversee negotiations, and
explore  strategic  alternatives.    The  board  was  assisted  in  its  review  by Goldman
Sachs and J.P. Morgan as financial advisors, and Simpson Thacher as independent
counsel.
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27.
Faced with Musk’s rapid accumulation of Twitter stock and take-it-or-
leave-it  offer,  and  concerned  that  he  might  launch  a  hostile  tender  offer without
notice,  the  board adopted a  customary  shareholder  rights  plan to  protect  its
stockholders from “coercive or otherwise unfair takeover tactics.â€Â  The board took
this action to reduce the likelihood of a takeover without payment of an appropriate
control  premium  and  to  ensure  that  the  board  had  sufficient  time  to  make  an
informed judgment on Musk’s or any other offer.  Under the rights plan’s terms, a
single  investor or  group’s  acquisition  of  more than  15%  of  the  company’s
outstanding  common  stock  without  board  approval  gives other  stockholders  the
opportunity to acquire additional stock at a considerable discount.  The plan was
adopted and announced on April 15, 2022.
28.
The board’s concerns proved well-grounded.  Musk began making all-
too-obvious public references to a hostile tender offer:
29.
At the same time, Musk worked to strengthen  the offer he had made
and might make by tender.  By April 20, he had personally committed $21 billion
in  equity financing and  lined  up  $25.5 billion  of  committed  debt  financing,  with
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$12.5 billion of that secured by his Tesla stock.
30.
Having obtained these commitments, Musk announced in an April 21,
2022 securities  filing that  his  offer  was  no  longer  conditioned  on  financing or
subject to due diligence:
At the time of delivery, the Proposal was also subject to
the  completion  of  financing  and  business  due  diligence,
but it is no longer subject to financing as a result of the
Reporting Person’s receipt of the financing commitments
. . . and is no longer subject to business due diligence.
Musk  proclaimed  himself prepared  to  begin  negotiations  “immediately,â€Â  and
confirmed he was “exploring whether to commence a tender offer.â€
31.
On  Saturday,  April  23,  2022,  Musk  asked  to  speak  with  Twitter
representatives  about  his  offer.    At  the  direction  of  the  transactions committee,
Taylor engaged with Musk, who reiterated that his offer was “best and finalâ€Â and
threatened once again to take it to Twitter’s stockholders directly if the board did
not engage immediately.
32.
The  following  day,  on  Sunday,  April  24,  2022,  Musk  tried  again  to
force Twitter’s hand. He delivered a letter to the board repeating that his $54.20
per share offer was “best and final,â€Â threatening once more to sell all of his shares
if  his  bid  were  rejected,  and  saying he  would  propose a  “seller friendlyâ€Â  merger
agreement  to  be  signed before  the  market  opened  the  next  day.    Musk’s counsel
sent over a draft agreement, reiterated that Musk’s offer was not contingent on any
-12-
due  diligence, and  underscored  that  the  form  of  the  proposed  agreement  was
“intended to make this easy on all to get to a deal asap.â€
33.
The agreement was negotiated through the night and, in the process,
became even more seller-friendly.  Among the provisions not contained in Musk’s
proposal but included  at Twitter’s  insistence were an undertaking  by  defendants,
including Musk, to “take or cause to be taken . . . all actions and to do, or cause to
be done, all things necessary, proper or advisableâ€Â to obtain the financing (already
committed) to consummate the transaction, Ex. 1 § 6.10(a); a clear disclaimer of
any  financing  condition to  closing,
id.
§ 6.10(f);  and  a  right  on Twitter’s part  to
request and promptly receive updates from Musk about his progress in obtaining
financing,
id.
§ 6.10(d).    These  provisions ensured  that  financing  would  be  no
obstacle to closing and that the company would have the right to stay informed of
Musk’s progress in arranging his financing.
34.
Twitter also negotiated for itself a right to hire and fire employees at
all  levels,  including executives,  without  having  to  seek  Musk’s  consent.
Musk’s initial  draft  of  the  merger  agreement  would  have  deemed  the  hiring  and
firing  of  an  employee  at  the  level  of  vice  president  or  above  a presumptive
violation  of  the  ordinary  course  covenant absent  Musk’s  consent.    Twitter
successfully struck that provision before signing.
35.
Twitter  further  negotiated  to  narrow  the  circumstances  under  which
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defendants  could  escape  the  deal  by  claiming  a  “Company  Material  Adverse
Effect.â€Â    In  addition  to  excluding,  for  example, market-wide  and industry-wide
effects  and  circumstances  and declines  in  stock  price  and  financial  performance,
the final definition excluded matters relating to or resulting from Musk’s identity
or communications, “performanceâ€Â of the agreement, and any matter disclosed by
Twitter  in  its  SEC  filings  other  than  the “Risk  Factorsâ€Â  and  “Forward-Looking
Statementsâ€Â sections of those disclosures.
Id.
Art. I.
36.
Finally,  and  critically,  Twitter  negotiated  for  itself a  robust right  to
demand specific performance of the agreement’s terms that encompassed the right
to  compel  defendants  to  close  the  deal,  and  ensured  that  Musk  personally  was
bound by that provision (among others).
Id.
§ 9.9(a)-(b), Preamble.
37.
At  a  board  meeting  on  April  25,  2022,  Goldman  Sachs  and
J.P. Morgan  each  presented  their  fairness  opinions,  and  the  board  discussed  the
agreement.  The board ultimately approved the merger agreement and decided to
recommend stockholder approval, both because the price was fair to stockholders
and  because  the  merger  agreement  promised a  high  level  of  closing  certainty.
Twitter  had  taken  Musk’s  claimed  “seller  friendlyâ€Â  draft  agreement  and  secured
other key concessions to make it even more so.  Not only were there no financing
or  diligence  conditions,  but  Musk  had  already  secured  debt  commitments  that
together with his personal equity commitment would suffice to fund the purchase.
-14-
38.
Twitter had been buffeted by Musk’s reversals before.  For the benefit
of  stockholders and  employees,  the  board needed assurance that  this  agreement
would stick.  It received that assurance in the terms it was able to negotiate.
III.
The final, agreed-upon deal terms
39.
The  terms  of  the  transaction  are  governed  by  the  merger  agreement
executed on April 25, 2022.
40.
Under  the  agreement,  at  closing,  Acquisition  Sub  will  merge  into
Twitter, and Twitter will continue as a private corporation owned by Musk through
his wholly  owned  shell companies.   Twitter stockholders will  receive $54.20 per
share in  cash,  and  the  company’s  common  stock  will  be  delisted  from  the  New
York Stock Exchange.
A.
Closing Conditions
41.
The  conditions  to  closing  are  few.    The  transaction  is  subject  to  a
majority  vote  of  Twitter’s  stockholders  and  to  specified regulatory  approvals.
Id.
§ 7.1.  The  deal  is  also  conditioned  on  the  non-occurrence  of  a  Company
Material  Adverse  Effect that  is  continuing  at  the  time  of  closing.
Id.
§ 7.2(c).
The agreement contains various representations by Twitter, including that its SEC
filings  since  January  1,  2022,  at  the  time  filed  or  at  the  time  amended  or
supplemented, are complete and accurate in all material respects, fairly depict the
financial condition of the company in all material respects, and were prepared in
-15-
accordance with GAAP.
Id.
§ 4.6.  Any inaccuracy in these representations does
not  excuse  closing  unless  it rises  to  the  level  of a  Company  Material  Adverse
Effect.
Id.
§ 7.2(b).
42.
Company Material Adverse Effect is defined as:
any  change,  event,  effect  or  circumstance which,
individually or in the aggregate, has resulted in or would
reasonably  be  expected  to result  in  a  material  adverse
effect  on  the  business,  financial  condition  or  results  of
operations of the Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as
a whole . . . .
Id.
Art.  I.    As  one  would  expect  with  a “seller  friendlyâ€Â  merger  agreement,  the
contract  identifies numerous  changes,  events,  and  circumstances  expressly
excluded from the determination of whether a Company Material Adverse Effect
has occurred:
[C]hanges,  events,  effects  or  circumstances  which,
directly or indirectly, to the extent they relate to or result
from the following shall be excluded from, and not taken
into  account in, the determination of  Company  Material
Adverse Effect:
(i)  any  condition,  change,  effect  or  circumstance
generally  affecting  any  of  the  industries  or  markets  in
which the Company or its Subsidiaries operate;
. . .
(iii) general economic, regulatory or political conditions
(or changes therein) or conditions (or changes therein) in
the  financial,  credit  or  securities  markets  (including
changes  in  interest  or  currency  exchange  rates)  in  the
United States or any other country or region in the world;
-16-
. . .
(iv)
the
negotiation,
execution,
announcement,
performance,  consummation  or  existence  of  this
Agreement  or  the  transactions  contemplated  by  this
Agreement,  including  (A)  by  reason  of  the  identity  of
Elon  Musk,  Parent  or  any  of  their  Affiliates  or  their
respective  financing  sources,  or  any  communication  by
Parent or any of its Affiliates or their respective financing
sources, including regarding their plans or intentions with
respect to the conduct of the business of the Company or
any  of  its  Subsidiaries  and  (B)  any  litigation,  claim  or
legal  proceeding  threatened  or  initiated  against  Parent,
Acquisition Sub, the Company or any of their respective
Affiliates, officers or directors, in each case, arising out
of  or  relating  to  the  this  Agreement  or  the  transactions
contemplated  by  this  Agreement,  and  including  the
impact of any of the foregoing on any relationships with
customers,  suppliers,  vendors,  collaboration  partners,
employees, unions or regulators;
. . .
(viii) any changes in the market price or trading volume
of  the  Company  Common  Stock,  any  failure  by  the
Company or its Subsidiaries to meet internal, analysts’ or
other  earnings  estimates  or  financial  projections  or
forecasts for any period, any changes in credit ratings and
any  changes  in  analysts’  recommendations  or  ratings
with  respect  to  the  Company  or  any  of  its  Subsidiaries
(provided that  the  facts  or  occurrences  giving  rise  to  or
contributing  to  such  changes  or  failure  that  are  not
otherwise  excluded  from  the  definition  of  “Company
Material  Adverse  Effectâ€Â  may  be  taken  into  account  in
determining whether there has been a Company Material
Adverse Effect); and
(ix)  any  matter  disclosed  in  the  Company  SEC
Documents filed by the Company prior to the date of this
Agreement (other than any disclosures set forth under the
-17-
headings
“Risk
Factorsâ€
or
“Forward-Looking
Statementsâ€).
Id.
43.
The  parties  thus  agreed  that  any  circumstance  affecting  the  market
generally  or  other  social  media  companies  would  not  excuse  defendants  from
closing.  Nor would any circumstance arising from the existence or performance of
the agreement, or from any communication by Musk, “including the impact of any
of the foregoingâ€Â on any of Twitter’s relationships with, among others, customers.
Likewise,  matters that  Twitter  disclosed in  sections  of its  SEC  filings other than
the “Risk Factorsâ€Â and “Forward-Looking Statementsâ€Â sections cannot constitute a
Company  Material  Adverse  Effect.
And  Twitter’s  failure  to  meet  financial
projections  will not excuse  closing  unless  that  failure  results from  an occurrence
independently  qualifying  as  a  Company  Material  Adverse  Effect (taking  into
account all of the express exclusions).
44.
The  agreement  also  makes  clear  that  financing is not  a  condition  to
closing:
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Agreement to
the contrary, the Equity Investor, Parent and Acquisition
Sub  each  acknowledge  and  affirm  that  it  is  not  a
condition to the Closing or to any of its obligations under
this  Agreement  that  the  Equity  Investor,  Parent,
Acquisition Sub and/or any of their respective Affiliates
obtain  any  financing  (including  the  Debt  Financing)  for
any of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement.
-18-
Id.
§ 5.4;
see also id.
§ 6.10(f).
45.
Nor  is  there  any  diligence  condition.    Indeed,  each  of  Parent  and
Acquisition  Sub represents that  it  “conducted,  to  its  satisfaction,  its  own
independent  investigation,  review  and  analysis  of  the  business,  results  of
operations, prospects, condition (financial or otherwise) or assets of the Company
and  its  Subsidiaries,â€Â and  that,  in  determining  to  proceed  with  the  merger,  each
“relied  solely  on  the  results  of  its  own  independent  review  and  analysis  and  the
covenants,  representations  and  warranties  of  the  Companyâ€Â  in  the  merger
agreement.
Id.
§ 5.11.    Parent  and  Acquisition  Sub  further  acknowledge  that
“neither the Company nor any of its Subsidiaries, nor any other Person, makes or
has  made  or  is  making  any  express  or  implied  representation  or  warranty  with
respect  to  the  Company  or  any of  its  Subsidiaries  or their  respective  business  or
operations, in each case, other than those expressly given solely by the Company in
Article IV,†and they represent that in agreeing to the merger they were not relying
on  “any  express  or  implied  representation  or  warranty,  or  the  accuracy  or  the
completeness of the representations and warranties†in the merger agreement about
Twitter and its business and its operations “other than those expressly given solely
by the Company in Article IV.â€
Id.
-19-
B.
Efforts Covenants
46.
The  agreement  requires  all parties,  including  Musk,  to  use  their
“reasonable  best  effortsâ€Â  to  consummate  the  merger  and  cause  all  of  the  closing
conditions to be satisfied.
Id.
§ 6.3(a).
47.
Defendants, including Musk, have a “hell-or-high-water†obligation to
close on their financing commitments for the transaction. Â They must:
take, or cause to be taken, all actions and . . . do, or cause
to  be  done,  all  things  necessary,  proper or  advisable  to
arrange, obtain and consummate the Financing at or prior
to the Closing on the terms and subject to the conditions
set  forth  in  the  Financing  Commitments  (including  any
“flexâ€Â provisions). . . .
Id.
§ 6.10(a).  More specifically, Musk and Parent have an unconditional obligation
to “take (or cause to be taken) all actions, and do (or cause to be done) all things
necessary,  proper  or  advisable  to  obtain  the  Equity  Financing,â€Â  which  includes,
among  other  things,  Musk’s  funding  of  his  personal equity  commitment  at  or
before closing.
Id.
§ 6.10(e).
C.
Information Sharing
48.
The merger agreement requires the parties to share certain information
with one another in the run-up to closing.
49.
Defendants, including Musk, are required to keep Twitter “reasonably
informed on a current basis of the status of [their] efforts to arrange and finalize the
Financingâ€Â  and  to  “promptly  provide  and  respond  to  any  updates  reasonably
-20-
requested  by  the  Company  with  respect  to  the  statusâ€Â  of  those  efforts.
Id.
§ 6.10(d)(iv)-(v).    For  its  part,  Twitter  is  required  to  use  its  “commercially
reasonable  best  effortsâ€Â  to  assist  defendants  with  arranging  financing,  but  that
obligation  is  qualified: Twitter  need  not  “prepare  or  provide  any  financial
statements  or  other financial  informationâ€Â  other  than  the  financial  information
provided to the SEC, nor provide any “other information that is not available to the
Company  without  undue  effort  or  expense.â€
Id.
§ 6.11(a). Moreover, Twitter’s
obligations  under  Section  6.11 are  its  “sole  obligation  .  .  .  with  respect  to
cooperation  in  connection  with  the  arrangement  of  any  financing,â€Â  and  Twitter
may  be  considered  to  have breached  the  provision  only  if  a  failure  by  Parent  to
obtain  the  committed  debt  financing  is  “due  solely  to  a  deliberate  action  or
omission  taken  or  omitted  to  be  taken  by  the  Company  in  material  breach  of  its
obligations.â€
Id.
50.
Subject  to  certain  conditions,  including  entry  into  a  confidentiality
agreement, Twitter must provide Parent and its advisors with “reasonable accessâ€
to  information  about  its  “business,  properties  and  personnelâ€Â  as  defendants
“reasonablyâ€Â  request.
Id.
§ 6.4.    The  information  requested  must  be  for  a
“reasonable  business  purpose
related  to  the  consummation  of  the  transactions
contemplated by this Agreement
.â€
Id.
(emphasis added). In addition, Twitter can
decline  a  request  if  in  its  “reasonable  judgmentâ€Â  it  determines  that  compliance
-21-
would  “cause  significant  competitive harm  to  the  Company  or  its  Subsidiaries  if
the transactions contemplated by this Agreement are not consummatedâ€Â or would
“violate  applicable  Law,â€Â  including  privacy  laws.
Id.
Parent  cannot  use  the
information  obtained  “for  any  competitive  or  other  purpose  unrelated  to  the
consummation  of  the  transactions  contemplated  by  th[e]  Agreement.â€
Id.
And
Parent must use its “reasonable best efforts to minimize any disruption toâ€Â Twitter
“that may result from requests for access.â€
Id.
D.
Ordinary Course Covenant
51.
The  agreement  contains  a  seller-friendly ordinary  course  covenant,
requiring  Twitter  to  use no  more  than  “its  commercially  reasonable  effortsâ€Â to
“conduct the business of the Company and its Subsidiaries in the ordinary course
of businessâ€Â unless, among other things, an action outside the ordinary course is
“agreed to in writing by Parent (which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld,
delayed or conditioned).â€
Id.
§ 6.1.  There is no requirement of compliance with
“past  practice.â€Â    And,  as  noted,  before  the  agreement  was  signed,  Twitter
succeeded in striking from the covenant a requirement to obtain Parent’s consent
for the hiring and firing of employees.
E.
Public Statements and Non-Disparagement
52.
Section  6.8  of  the  agreement  contains  standard  language  requiring
each side to consult with the other before issuing certain public statements, as well
-22-
as negotiated  language  concerning  Musk’s  ability  to  Tweet  about  the  merger.
Under  the  provision,  Musk may  so  Tweet only  “so  long  as  such  Tweets  do  not
disparage the Company or any of its Representatives.â€
Id.
§ 6.8.
F.
Termination
53.
Defendants’ ability to terminate the agreement before the presumptive
drop-dead  date  of  October  24,  2022 is extremely  limited  and carefully
circumscribed.    While  there  are  closing  conditions  related  to  the  accuracy  of
Twitter’s  representations  and warranties  and to  Twitter’s  compliance  with  its
covenants,  there  is  no  right  for  defendants  to  terminate  unless  there  is a  breach
sufficiently  significant  to  cause  failure  of  a  closing  condition,  which,  after  due
notice, is either incapable of being cured or is not cured within 30 days after such
notice.
Id.
§ 8.1(d).   Defendants have no  right to  terminate, moreover, if  any  of
them are in material breach of their own obligations under the agreement.
Id.
G.
Specific Performance
54.
Twitter  may  seek specific  performance,  an  injunction,  or  other
equitable  relief to  enforce  any  of  defendants’  obligations  under  the  merger
agreement.
Id.
§ 9.9(a).  It  has  the  specific  power  to  compel  Musk to  fund  the
equity financing and close the merger, provided the closing conditions are met (or
are  capable  of  being  met  at  the  time  of  closing),  the  debt  financing  (which  is
already committed) has been or will be funded at the closing, and the company is
-23-
itself prepared to close.
Id.
§ 9.9(b).
IV.
The financing structure
55.
At  the  time  of  signing,  the  financing  for  the  transaction  had  three
components: loans to the post-closing Twitter, a personal loan on margin to Musk
(against his Tesla stock), and an equity commitment from Musk himself.
56.
The  loans to  Twitter,  of  up  to  $13  billion in  the  aggregate, are
promised  by  Morgan  Stanley  Senior  Funding,  Inc.  and  other  lenders  in  a  debt
commitment  letter  dated  April  25,  2022.    The  committed  financing  comprises  a
$6.5  billion  term  loan,  a  $500  million  revolving  credit  facility,  and $6  billion  of
bridge financing.  Although the debt commitment letter requires Musk to assist the
lenders in marketing the debt, his failure to do so does not release the lenders from
their obligation to fund and the financing is not conditioned on the lenders’ ability
to  market  the  debt.    The lenders’ obligation  is  subject  only  to  the  closing  of  the
merger  itself and  certain  other  conditions  the  satisfaction  of  which  lies  in
defendants’ control.
57.
The margin loan of $12.5 billion to Musk personally was promised by
Morgan  Stanley  Senior  Funding,  Inc.  and  other  lenders  in  a  margin  loan
commitment letter also dated April 25, 2022.  The loan was to be secured by $62.5
billion  worth  of  Musk’s Tesla  stock — about  62  million  shares  at  the  time  of
signing.
-24-
58.
Under an equity commitment letter dated April 20, 2022, Musk also
personally  agreed  to  contribute  to  or  otherwise  provide  to  Parent  $21  billion  of
equity  capital to  be  used  to  fund  the  purchase  price.    Because  much of  his  net
worth is tied up in Tesla shares, Musk would need to sell — indeed, has already
sold — millions of those shares to fund his equity commitment.
59.
The structure  of  Musk’s  financing  meant  that  the merger  could
become significantly more expensive for him if Tesla’s stock price were to decline
(and significantly less expensive if Tesla’s stock price were to rise).  For the equity
component,  the  lower  Tesla’s  stock  price  was,  the  more  shares  of  Tesla  Musk
would  need  to  sell  to  provide  the  cash  he  committed.    For  the  margin  loans,  a
substantial  decline  in  Tesla’s  stock  price  would  require  Musk  to  pledge  more
shares or cash as collateral to the financing sources.
V.
The market turns
60.
The risk of market decline, which was Musk’s alone to bear under the
merger agreement, materialized.  Soon after signing, the U.S. capital markets took
a  turn  for  the  worse. Within  a  week  after  April  25,  2022,  the  date  the  merger
agreement was executed, Musk elected to sell 9.8 million Tesla shares to finance
the  merger  at  prices  as  low  as  $822.68  per  share,  substantially  below  their  pre-
Twitter-signing price of $1,005 per share. He then promptly Tweeted, “No further
TSLA sales planned after today.â€Â But the Tesla stock price kept dropping, putting
-25-
Musk  at  risk  of  needing  to  pledge  yet  more  Tesla  shares  to  consummate  his
proposed margin loan and to sell still more to fund his equity commitment.
61.
On May 4, 2022, Parent and Musk, faced with needing to pledge more
Tesla shares  to satisfy  the  condition that the  margin loan  not exceed 20% of  the
value of the pledged stock, decreased the amount of that loan.  On May 24, without
notifying Twitter, they dispensed with the loan entirely and agreed in a new equity
commitment letter to increase Musk’s equity commitment to $33.5 billion.  That
letter,  which  remains  operative,  gives  Twitter  third-party  beneficiary  rights  to
enforce directly against Musk his equity commitment in accordance with its terms
and the terms of the merger agreement.
62.
Musk  remains  personally  responsible  for  $33.5  billion  of  the
approximately $44 billion required to complete the transaction.
VI.
Musk grasps for an out
63.
Musk  wanted an  escape. But  the merger  agreement  left  him  little
room.  With no financing contingency or diligence condition, the agreement gave
Musk no  out absent  a  Company  Material  Adverse  Effect or  a  material  covenant
breach by Twitter. Musk had to try to conjure one of those.
A.
False or spam accounts
64.
What  Musk  alighted  upon  first  was  a  representation  in  Twitter’s
quarterly  SEC  filings  over  many  consecutive  years  that  based  on  its  internal
-26-
processes  the  company estimated  “the  average  of  false  or  spam  accountsâ€Â  on  its
platform  “represented  fewer  than  5%  of  our  mDAU  during  the  quarter.â€
“Monetizable  Daily  Active  Usage  or  Users,â€Â or  mDAU,  is  a  non-GAAP  metric
Twitter  employs  to  measure  the  number  of  people  or  organizations  that  use the
Twitter platform. In its filings, Twitter defines mDAU as “people, organizations or
other accounts who logged in or were otherwise authenticated and accessed Twitter
on any given day through twitter.com, Twitter applications that are able to show
ads, or paid Twitter products, including subscriptions.â€
65.
In addition to deploying automated and manual processes that suspend
on  average  more  than  a  million  suspicious  accounts each  day, the  company
undertakes  a  rigorous,  daily process using  human  reviewers to  estimate spam  or
false  accounts remaining  on  its  platform after  automated filtering and  manual
review.
66.
Twitter’s SEC disclosures regarding that process and its findings are
heavily qualified.  As described in the “Note Regarding Key Metrics†section of its
filings, Twitter’s “calculation of mDAU is not based on any standardized industry
methodology,â€Â  “may  differ  from  estimates  published  by  third  parties  or  from
similarly-titled  metrics  of  our  competitors,â€Â  and  “may  not  accurately  reflect  the
actual number of people or organizations using our platform.â€Â  As for the estimate
of  spam  or false  accounts as  a  percentage  of  mDAU,  Twitter  explains  that  it  is
-27-
based  on  “an  internal  review  of  a  sample  of  accounts,â€Â  involves  “significant
judgment,â€Â  “may  not  accurately  represent  the  actual number  of  [false  or  spam]
accounts,†and could be too low.  Twitter has published the same qualified estimate
— that fewer than 5% of mDAU are spam or false — for the last three years, and
published similar estimates for five years preceding that.
67.
Musk was well aware when he signed the merger agreement that spam
accounted  for  some  portion  of  Twitter’s  mDAU,  and  well  aware  of  Twitter’s
qualified disclosures.  Spam was one of the main reasons Musk cited, publicly and
privately, for wanting to buy the company.  On April 9, 2022, the day Musk said
he wanted to buy Twitter rather than join its board, he texted Taylor that “purging
fake usersâ€Â from the platform had to be done in the context of a private company
because he believed it would “make the numbers look terrible.â€Â  At a public event
on April 14, Musk said eliminating spam bots would be a “top priorityâ€Â for him in
running Twitter.  On April 21, days before the deal was inked, he declared:
-28-
Musk echoed that same sentiment in the press release announcing the merger on
April  25,  stating that  upon  acquiring  Twitter  he  would  prioritize “defeating  the
spam bots, and authenticating all humans.â€
68.
Yet  Musk made  his  offer without  seeking any representation  from
Twitter regarding its estimates of spam or false accounts.  He even sweetened his
offer to the Twitter board by expressly withdrawing his prior diligence condition.
69.
On  May  5,  2022,  Musk  announced  that  he  had  raised  an  additional
$7.1  billion  of  equity  commitments  for  the  deal  from  19 investors  — including
$1 billion from Oracle chairman Larry Ellison, $800 million from Sequoia Capital,
$400 million from Andreessen Horowitz, and $375 million from a subsidiary of the
Qatari  sovereign  wealth  fund. Musk’s  investors,  all  sophisticated  market
participants,  made  these  commitments  in  the  face  of Musk’s  public  statements
regarding spam accounts, and knowing he had forsworn diligence. Musk made his
plans to address spam a key part of his pitch: As Andreessen Horowitz’s co-CEO
stated in publicly announcing the investment, the firm thought Musk was “perhaps
the only person in the worldâ€Â who could “fixâ€Â Twitter’s alleged “difficult issue[]â€
with “bots.â€
70.
Then,  however, as  the  market  (and  Tesla’s  stock  price)  declined,
Musk’s advisors began to demand detailed information about Twitter’s methods of
calculating mDAU and estimating the prevalence of false or spam accounts.
-29-
71.
Twitter  had  entered  into  a  confidentiality  agreement  with  Musk  to
share non-public  information  in  preparation  for  post-closing  transition,  and
convened an in-person meeting with Musk and his team on May 6, 2022.  Among
the topics of discussion were mDAU and spam-related subjects.  In advance of the
meeting,  Musk’s bankers  circulated  an  agenda with  items related to users  on the
Twitter platform, including:  “How do you estimate that fewer than 5% of mDAU
are false or spam accounts?â€Â  Twitter’s representatives addressed that question at
the meeting, summarizing the company’s process.
72.
Following up on or about May 9, Musk’s bankers at Morgan Stanley
added  entries  to  their diligence  tracker  requesting user-related  information,
including  a  request  for  “User  database  containing  key  metrics  including,  but  not
limited to,  number of  users,  number  of verified  users,  number  of  monthly  active
users,  number  of  handles,  etc.â€Â    Neither Musk  nor  his  advisors  said  what  had
prompted  these requests  or identified new  information  regarding  spam  or  false
accounts  that  had  come  to  light  warranting  the  inquiries.    Nothing  had  changed
about Twitter’s estimates concerning the prevalence of spam on the platform in the
days since signing. Nonetheless, in the spirit of cooperation, Twitter responded on
May  12  with  data  sets and  written  descriptions  of  its  audience  metrics  and  its
process for sampling the prevalence of false or spam accounts.
73.
Early  on  May  13,  2022,  in  advance  of a  diligence  meeting  that  had
-30-
been scheduled to discuss the data Twitter had provided, Musk Tweeted without
any advance notice to the company that the “Twitter deal [is] temporarily on holdâ€
until the company showed him proof for its estimate that less than 5% of Twitter
accounts are spam or false:
The  Reuters  story  Musk  linked  to  in  his  Tweet  was  a  report  on  Twitter’s  10-Q
filing made on May 2, 2022, and contained the same heavily qualified 5% estimate
Twitter had been disclosing in its SEC filings for the past three years.  Musk had
no  basis  for  asserting  that  the  deal  was  “on  holdâ€Â  based  on  this  longstanding
disclosure.  Twitter’s deal counsel called Musk’s deal counsel.  Two hours after the
“on  holdâ€Â  Tweet was  published,  Musk  belatedly  Tweeted  that  he  was  still
“committed†to the deal.
-31-
74.
Cognizant of its own obligations under the merger agreement, Twitter
proceeded with the May 13 diligence meeting, which lasted for about two hours.
During  this  session,  Twitter  explained,  among  other  things,  that its  spam
estimation  process entails  daily  sampling  for  a  total  set  of  approximately 9,000
accounts per quarter that are manually reviewed.
75.
Later  that day,  Musk Tweeted publicly  a  misrepresentation  that
Twitter’s sample size for spam estimates was just 100.
-32-
76.
The  next  day,  he  boasted publicly  that  he  had  violated  his  non-
disclosure obligations:
77.
Musk’s Tweets on May 13 and 14 violated his obligations under the
merger  agreement,  including the  provisions  prohibiting  public  comments  not
consented  to  by  Twitter,  disparagement, misuse  of  information  provided  under
Section 6.4, requiring best efforts to consummate the merger.
78.
On May 16, Agrawal Tweeted that Twitter’s 5% estimate is based on
“multiple human reviews (in replicate) for thousands of accounts, that are sampled
at  random,  consistently  over  time,  from  *accounts  we  count  as  mDAUs*.â€
He explained  that  the  company’s  human  review  process  “uses both  public  and
private data (eg, IP address, phone number, geolocation, client/browser signatures,
what  the  account  does  when  it’s  active…)  to  make  a determination on  each
accountâ€Â — something Twitter also explains in its SEC filings.  Agrawal stood by
Twitter’s estimate, and noted that the company is constantly updating its systems
-33-
and rules to remove as much spam as possible:
79.
Musk responded with another disparaging Tweet:
-34-
80.
As  the  market  continued  to  fall,  Musk persisted  in  his public  and
misleading attacks on Twitter’s handling and disclosure of spam or false accounts.
In another Tweet on May 15, 2022 and a statement at a technology conference on
May 16, Musk made the baseless claim that fake users might account for as much
as  90%  of  Twitter’s  users.  Asked whether  the  “Twitter  deal  [is] going  to  get
closed,â€Â  Musk  responded  that  “it  really  depends  on  a  lot  of  factorsâ€Â  and  posited
that  Twitter’s  estimate  that  spam  or false  accounts  comprised  fewer  than  5%  of
mDAU  might  be  “a  material  adverse  misstatementâ€Â  if  “in  fact  it  is  four  or  five
times that number, or perhaps ten times that number.â€
81.
On May 17, 2022, Musk Tweeted, without basis or explanation, that
“20% fake/spam  accounts,  while  4  times  what  Twitter  claims,  could  be  *much*
higher,â€Â adding that “[t]his deal cannot move forwardâ€Â pending further analysis of
Twitter’s  spam  estimates.    In  yet  another  breach  of  his  non-disparagement
obligation  and  efforts  covenants,  Musk  encouraged  the  SEC  to  investigate  the
accuracy of Twitter’s disclosures:
-35-
B.
Defendants’ lawyer letters
82.
Even as Musk was violating his own contractual obligations, Twitter
continued  to  respond  cooperatively  to  his  representatives’  increasingly
unreasonable  inquiries.    Between  May  16  and  May  20,  the  company  provided
detailed written responses to several information requests.
83.
On May 20, 2022, Musk’s team sent a request for Twitter’s “firehoseâ€
data  — which  is  essentially  a  live-feed  of  data  concerning  activity  (Tweeting,
Retweeting, and “likingâ€Â Tweets, for example) associated with the public accounts
on  Twitter’s  platform.    Again,  no explanation  was  offered  for  how  this  request
furthered  a  “reasonable  business  purpose  related  to  the  consummation  of  the
transactions contemplated byâ€Â  the  merger  agreement, as  required by  Section 6.4.
Nor  can  the  firehose  data  even  be  used  to  accurately  estimate  the  prevalence  of
-36-
spam  or  false  accounts.    As  Agrawal  had  explained  in  his  May  16  Tweets,  that
estimate depends in part on private data not available in the firehose.  Conversely,
the firehose includes Tweets that Twitter’s systems and processes catch and do not
count within mDAU for that day.
84.
On  May  21,  2022,  Twitter  hosted  a  third  diligence  session  with
Musk’s  team  and  yet  again discussed  Twitter’s  processes  for  calculating  mDAU
and estimates of spam or false accounts.  Twitter also provided a detailed summary
document  describing the  process  the  company  uses  to  estimate  spam  as  a
percentage of mDAU.
85.
Defendants responded with  increasingly  invasive  and  unreasonable
requests.  And rather than use “reasonable best efforts to minimize any disruption
to the respective business of the Company and its Subsidiaries that may result from
requests  for  access,â€Â  Ex. 1  § 6.4,  defendants  repeatedly  demanded  immediate
responses  to  their  access  requests.    The  scope  of  the  requests  and  the  deadlines
defendants  imposed  on  their  satisfaction  were  unreasonable,  disruptive  to  the
business, and far outside the bounds of Section 6.4.
86.
Twitter nonetheless continued to work with Musk to try to respond to
the requests.    It  extended  an  ongoing  offer  to  engage  with  Musk  and  his
representatives regarding its calculation of mDAU, and held several more diligence
sessions  through  the  end  of  May.    It  also  provided  detailed  written  responses,
-37-
including custom reporting, to his escalating requests for information.
87.
On  May  25,  2022,  defendants’ counsel sent  the  first  of  a  series  of
aggressive letters copying their litigation counsel at Quinn Emmanuel.  This one
falsely asserted that  Twitter  had  “failed  to  respond  to  anyâ€Â  of  defendants’
information requests and insisted that defendants be granted access to the firehose
data so Musk could “make an independent assessment of the prevalence of fake or
spam  accounts  on  Twitter’s  platform.â€Â    Though  the  letter  called  Twitter’s  own
spam detection methodologies “lax,†it identified no basis for that charge.
88.
Nor, again, did defendants explain how fulfillment of the firehose data
demand  would  further  consummation  of  the  merger or  what  basis  they had  to
demand the right to “make an independent assessmentâ€Â of the prevalence of false
or  spam  accounts  on  the  platform.    Even  assuming  that  was  a  proper  purpose,
reviewing  the  full  firehose  data  would  not  result  in  an  accurate  assessment  or
mimic the rigorous process that Twitter employs by sampling accounts and using
public and private data to manually determine whether an account constitutes spam
— as Twitter’s representatives had already repeatedly explained to Musk’s team.
89.
On May 27, 2022, Twitter responded by noting its weeks-long active
engagement  with  Musk’s  team and  explaining  that  some  of  defendants’ requests
sought disclosure of highly sensitive information and data that would be difficult to
furnish and would expose Twitter to competitive harm if shared.  After all, Musk
-38-
had said he would do one of three things with Twitter: sit on its board, buy it, or
build a competitor.  He had already accepted and then rejected the first option, and
was plotting a pretextual escape from the second.  Musk’s third option — building
a competitor to Twitter — remained.  Still, Twitter again responded constructively
and  reiterated  its  commitment  to  work  with  Musk’s  team  to  provide  reasonable
access to requested information.
90.
On  May  31,  2022,  defendants lobbed  another  missive,  again  falsely
asserting  that  Twitter  had  “refusedâ€Â  to  provide requested  data  and  that  the
company’s spam or false account detection methods were “inadequate.â€Â  The letter
claimed Musk was willing to  implement protocols  to protect against  “damage or
competitive harm to the company.â€
91.
On June 1, 2022, Twitter responded by refuting that it had “refusedâ€
provision  of  data,  demonstrating that,  to  the  contrary,  it  had  been  working  with
Musk’s team to honor their requests within the bounds of the contract.  To help set
the  protocols  Musk  had  said  he  was  willing  to  honor,  Twitter  asked  a  series  of
questions directed at how the data would be used and by whom, and how it would
be protected.
92.
Defendants’ response on June 6, 2022 made no effort to answer those
questions  or  identify  data-protection  protocols;  instead,  it  accused  Twitter  of
breach and advanced a false narrative that Twitter had been stonewalling Musk’s
-39-
requests.  Musk publicly filed the letter, which repeated his baseless and damaging
charge that Twitter had  “laxâ€Â detection methods.   He included  none of Twitter’s
correspondence in that filing and omitted all details about the information Twitter
had
provided.    He  thus  continued  to  present  the  public  with  a  misleadingly
incomplete  narrative  about  his  communications  with  Twitter,  with  equally
misleading implications about the likelihood that the merger would be completed
and about Twitter’s operations.
93.
Steadfast  in  its  commitment  to  consummate the  merger,  Twitter
continued  to  try  to  get  Musk’s  team  what  it  demanded  while  safeguarding  its
customers’ data and harboring very real concerns about how Musk might use the
data  if  he  succeeded  in  escaping  the  deal.    On  or  about  June  9,  2022,  Musk’s
counsel indicated that granting access to 30 days’ worth of historical firehose data
would satisfy Musk’s request for the firehose data.  So, on June 15, the company
gave Musk’s team secure access to that raw data — about 49 tebibytes’ worth. It
did  so  even  though  the  merger  agreement  did  not  require  the  sharing  of  this
information.
94.
Musk’s next  lawyer  letter,  dated June  17,  2022,  skimmed  over this
massive  data  production.  Like  the  earlier  correspondence,  the  June  17  letter
described  an  alternative  reality  in  which  Twitter  had  failed  to  cooperate  in
supplying Musk with information, entirely contrary to the facts, apparently in the
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belief that repeating a falsehood enough can make it true.  The letter also continued
to  move the  goal  posts  by  adding a  new  request  for  “the  sample  setâ€Â  and
“calculationsâ€Â Twitter used to estimate that fewer than 5% of its mDAUs are false
or  spam  accounts over  the  past  eight  quarters.    Thus,  with  no  basis,  defendants
sought  to  audit  information  Twitter  consistently  had  caveated  as  an  “estimateâ€
requiring “significant judgment†to prepare.
95.
The  June  17  letter  further  contained  a  litigation-style  discovery
demand for information Musk asserted was needed to investigate “the truthfulness
of Twitter’s representations to date regarding its active user base, and the veracity
of its methodologies for determining that user base.â€Â  It broadly demanded board
materials relating to mDAU and spam, as well as emails, text messages, and other
communications  about  those  topics — highly  unusual  requests  in  the  context  of
good faith efforts toward completion of any merger transaction, and absurd in the
context  of  this  one,  which  has  no  diligence  condition.    Musk  propounded  these
unreasonable  requests  and  touted  his  contrived  narrative  about  Twitter’s
methodologies, all without ever identifying a basis for questioning the veracity of
Twitter’s methodologies or the accuracy of its SEC disclosures.
96.
On June 20, 2022, Twitter set the record straight in a detailed response
letter.    It  noted that  the  two  sides  had  been  working  collaboratively  to  clear
regulatory  hurdles  and  “address voluminous  data  requestsâ€Â  from  defendants,  that
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Twitter had “dedicated significant resources†to providing defendants with the data
requested,  and  that  Twitter  had  already  provided  a  wealth  of  data  sweeping  far
beyond the bounds of what might conceivably be deemed reasonably necessary to
consummate the transaction.  Twitter noted that Musk, while continuing to accuse
Twitter  of  misrepresenting  its  spam  or false  account  estimate,  had  offered  not  a
single  fact  to  support  the  accusation.    And  Twitter  observed  that  defendants’
“increasingly  irrelevant,  unsupportable,  and  voluminous  information  requestsâ€
appeared directed not at consummating the merger but rather the opposite: trying
to avoid the merger.
97.
Nonetheless,  in  a  continuing effort  at  cooperation, Twitter  agreed  to
provide  Musk everything  he now  demanded  regarding  the  firehose,  including
access to “100% of Tweets and favoriting activity.† Twitter cautioned, as it had so
many  times before,  that this  data would not  allow  Musk  to  accurately assess the
number  of  spam  or  false  accounts.    But  on  June  21,  2022,  it  gave  defendants’
counsel the demanded access.
98.
Meanwhile, Agrawal and Twitter CFO Ned Segal had been trying to
set  up  a  meeting  with  Musk  to discuss  the  company’s  process  in  estimating  the
prevalence  of  spam  or  false  accounts.    On  June  17,  2022,  Segal  proposed  a
discussion  with  Musk  and  his  team  to “cover  spam  as  a  %  of  DAU.â€Â    Musk
responded that he had a conflict at the proposed time.  When Agrawal sought to
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reengage on the matter, Musk agreed to a time on June 21, but then bowed out and
asked  Agrawal  and  Segal  to  speak  with  his team  not  about  the  spam  estimation
process but “the pro forma financials for the debt.â€
99.
On  June  29,  2022,  Musk complained through  counsel that  Twitter
purportedly  had  “placed  an  artificial  cap  on  the  number  of  searchesâ€Â  Musk’s
experts could run on the firehose data, and had failed to respond to certain of the
new requests made on June 17.  (False again, as explained below.)  The June 29
letter notably did not take issue with Twitter’s refusal to provide responses to the
discovery-like requests for emails, text messages, and other communications in the
June 17 letter.  But it contained a slew of new demands — several asking Twitter
to create more custom reporting.
100. On July 1, 2022, Twitter pointed out just how far beyond the scope of
Section  6.4  defendants’ requests  had  strayed.    Nonetheless,  Twitter noted  that  it
was providing  yet  more information  in  response  to  recent  requests  and  would
continue to devote the “time and considerable resourcesâ€Â necessary to respond to
outstanding  requests.    Twitter  also  explained  that  it  had  placed  “no  artificial
throttling  of  rate  limits.â€Â    In  follow-up  correspondence,  it  became  clear  that  the
“limitâ€Â Musk had bumped up against was not the result of throttling but a default
100,000-per-month limit on the number of
queries
that could be conducted.  With
his undisclosed team of data reviewers working behind the scenes, Musk had hit
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that limit within about two weeks.  Twitter immediately agreed to, and did, raise
the monthly search query limit one hundred-fold, to 10 million — more than 100
times what most paying Twitter customers would get.
101. From  the  outset of  this  extraordinary  post-signing  information
exchange  process,  Musk  accused  Twitter  of  “laxâ€Â  methodologies  for  calculating
spam or false accounts.  Knowing that his actions risked harm to Twitter and its
stockholders,  wreaked  havoc  on  the  trading  price  of  Twitter’s  stock,  and  could
have  serious  consequences  for  the  deal,  Musk leveled  serious  charges,  both
publicly  and  through  lawyer  letters,  that  Twitter  had  misled  its  investors  and
customers.    But  Musk  exhibited little interest  in understanding  Twitter’s  process
for estimating spam accounts that went into the company’s disclosures.  Indeed, in
a  June  30  conversation  with  Segal,  Musk  acknowledged he  had  not read  the
detailed  summary  of  Twitter’s  sampling  process  provided  back  in  May.    Once
again, Segal offered to spend time with Musk and review the detailed summary of
Twitter’s  sampling  process  as  the  Twitter  team  had  done  with  Musk’s  advisors.
That meeting never occurred despite multiple attempts by Twitter.
102. From  the  outset,  defendants’ information  requests  were  designed  to
try to tank the deal.  Musk’s increasingly outlandish requests reflect not a genuine
examination of Twitter’s processes but a litigation-driven campaign to try to create
a record of non-cooperation on Twitter’s part. When Twitter nonetheless bent over
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backwards to address the increasingly burdensome requests, Musk resorted to false
assertions that it had not.
C.
Financial information
103. In seeking to manufacture a record of covenant breach, Musk seized
not  just  on  Section  6.4  but  also  on  Section  6.11,  which  obligates  Twitter  to
reasonably cooperate with Parent to facilitate arrangement of debt financing.
104. Throughout  the  post-signing  period,  Twitter’s  advisors  had  been
working with Musk’s representatives to furnish them relevant financial information
about the company.  These discussions had been productive under the supervision
on Musk’s side of Bob Swan, a respected Silicon Valley financial professional and
former CEO of Intel Corporation.  Swan had been in regular contact with Segal,
and  had  been  leading  defendants’ purported  effort  to  consummate  the  debt
financing.
105. Then,  in  his  June  17  lawyer  letter,  Musk demanded  a  collection  of
financial information he claimed was necessary to “better understand the state of
Twitter’s  business  and  outlook,  which  is  related  to  his  acquisition  plans  and  his
financing  for  the  transaction.â€Â    He  demanded  a  “working,  bottoms-up  financial
model for 2022,†budget plans with underlying modeling, and a “working copy†of
Goldman Sachs’s “valuation model underlying its fairness opinion.â€Â This demand
is extremely unusual in merger transactions, and neither in conveying the demand
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nor  at  any  time  since  have  defendants  pointed  to  a  request  from  any  lender  that
would justify it.  Notably, Musk’s debt financing commitments are not conditioned
on receipt of any financial information about Twitter other than that contained in
its quarterly SEC filings. Ex. 2 § 1, E-2 (Ex. E) § 6.
106. Around the same time as the request, on June 21, 2022, Musk falsely
represented in a Bloomberg interview that an item requiring resolution “before the
transaction can completeâ€Â is “will the debt portion of the round come together?â€
As  Musk  well  knew,  financing  expressly  is
not
a  condition  to  closing  under  the
agreement.
107. Still,  intent  on  facilitating  the  merger’s  consummation,  Twitter
provided Musk  with  significant  supporting  detail  for  its  proxy  case projections,
shared  some  of  its  financial  plans, and  gave him  a  copy  of  its  bankers’ final
presentation to Twitter’s board.
VII. Defendants materially breach their obligations to work toward closing
and refrain from unreasonable withholding of consent to operational
changes
108. Consummating  a  merger  agreement  involves  substantial  effort  and
requires  a  serious  deployment  of  resources by  the  seller.    Defendants thus  are
subject to contractual obligations requiring them to take actions necessary to close
and to allow Twitter to operate as efficiently as possible in the interim.  Defendants
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violated two important obligations of this kind: the duty to work toward finalizing
the financing for the closing and the obligation to consider consents reasonably.
A.
Defendants abandon financing-related efforts and breach
Section 6.10(d)
109. Musk’s  distortive  public  statements  about  the  deal,  and  his
increasingly  aggressive  information  demands  through  counsel,  raised  Twitter’s
suspicion  that  he was  secretly  abandoning  efforts to  finalize the  committed debt
financing in time for a prompt closing.  Section 6.10 requires defendants to take all
steps necessary to secure the already-committed financing for the closing.
110. Twitter’s  concern deepened when,  on  June  23,  2022,  Musk  texted
Twitter  management  to  say  that  he  had  asked  Swan “to  depart  the  deal
proceedings, as we are not on the same wavelength.â€Â  At the same time, Musk said
he was “trying to prepare the cash flow projections necessary to secure the debt,â€
and  asked for  Twitter’s  “cash  flow  projections  over  the  next  three  yearsâ€Â  and  a
comparison of historical projections to actuals — to assist “debt issuersâ€Â who “are
much  more  conservative  than  equity  investors.â€Â    Customarily,  projections  are
needed well in advance of closing and before approaching ratings agencies, which
is a key first step in consummating debt financing.  They are the buyer’s, not the
seller’s, responsibility.
See
Ex. 1 § 6.11.
111. Over the ensuing days, Twitter’s repeated requests for a contact in lieu
of Swan generated no response. Outreach by Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan to
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Morgan Stanley likewise was met with silence.
112. Faced  with  this  uncertainty  and  with  Musk’s  insinuations  about  his
lenders, on June 28 and again on July 6, Twitter exercised its rights under Section
6.10(d) of the merger agreement  to formally seek information about the status of
Musk’s financing.
113. Defendants still have provided no substantive response. Instead, the
day after the first of these requests, Musk warned Agrawal and Segal to back off:
114. On  June  30, 2022,  Musk  informed  Segal that  replacement  team
member (and long-time Musk confidant) Antonio Gracias would be taking over the
financing effort that Swan had helmed. Â But Gracias never appeared.
B.
Musk delays and stymies key operational decisions
115. Since signing, Twitter has complied in all respects with its obligation
under Section 6.1 of the merger agreement to operate the business in the ordinary
course.  In an excess of caution, the company has sought Musk’s consent even for
matters falling well within the zone of commercial reasonableness.  Though Musk
has approved some of Twitter’s requests, he has been slow to respond to ones that
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required urgency and has unreasonably withheld his consent to others, in breach of
his own obligations under Section 6.1.
116. Most  notably,  Musk  has  unreasonably  withheld  consent  to  two
employee retention programs designed to keep selected top talent during a period
of intense uncertainty generated in large part by Musk’s erratic conduct and public
disparagement of the company and its personnel.
117. During  negotiation  of  the  merger  agreement,  Twitter had sought
Musk’s consent to a broad retention plan.  Musk’s team deferred decision on the
matter; the plan Twitter proposed was detailed, and time for negotiation was short.
But Musk indicated he was open to further discussion.
118. During  a  May  6,  2022  post-signing  diligence  session,  Twitter
management  again  broached  the  subject of  retention,  and  Musk  was  non-
committal.    He  suggested  the  matter  be  tabled  pending  further  clarity  on  the
expected interval before closing the deal.
119. Over  the  weeks  that  followed,  Swan discussed  with  Twitter
management a narrower retention plan than the one that had been discussed during
the merger agreement negotiations.  Consistent with those discussions, on June 20,
2022,  Twitter sent  defendants a  formal  request  for  consent  to two  tailored
employee  retention  programs  that  had  been  vetted  by  the  board  and  its
compensation  committee  with  the  assistance  of  an  outside  compensation
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consultant.
120. Musk initially failed to respond at all to the June 20 consent request.
(It would soon become clear that he had fired Swan.) After a follow-up request for
consent, Musk’s counsel stated tersely that “Elon is not supportive of this program
and  has  declined  to  grant  consent  for  it.â€Â    Twitter  offered  to  arrange  a  meeting
between Musk and Lane Fox to explain the importance and utility of the proposed
programs.    Musk’s  counsel  repeated  that  Musk  “doesn’t  believe  a  retention
program is warranted in the current environment,â€Â and said Musk was unwilling to
consider  the  advice  of  compensation  consultants,  but  left  open  the  possibility  of
speaking with Lane Fox.
121. On  June  28,  2022,  following  further  stonewalling  from  Musk’s
counsel, Twitter  urged  that  a  discussion  would  be  fruitful.    After  initially
suggesting Musk might be “amenable to a call next week,†Musk’s counsel replied,
“Elon already gave his response but I’ll remind him of Martha’s request for a call.â€
The call never happened — Musk has continued to duck it — and neither retention
program has been implemented due to defendants’ unexplained and unreasonable
withholding of consent.  Employee attrition, meanwhile, has been on the upswing
since the signing of the merger agreement.
122. Defendants have unreasonably withheld consent in other domains as
well.    On  June  14,  2022,  Twitter  sought  consent  to  terminate  Twitter’s  existing
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revolving  credit  facility,  noting  that  no  amounts  were  presently  drawn  under  the
facility  and  that  the  facility  would  have  to  be  terminated  in  connection  with  the
merger’s consummation.  Maintaining the facility requires Twitter to incur ongoing
monthly costs.  After initially saying he would consent to the termination, Musk
withdrew it the next day without explanation.
VIII. Defendants purport to terminate the merger agreement
123. On  July  8,  2022,  defendants’ counsel  sent  a  letter  to  Twitter
purporting to terminate the merger agreement.
124. The notice alleges three grounds for termination: (i) purported breach
of  the  information-sharing  and  cooperation  covenants contained  in  Sections  6.4
and  6.11;  (ii)  supposed  “materially  inaccurate  representationsâ€Â  incorporated  by
reference  in  the  merger  agreement that  allegedly  are  “reasonably  likely  to  result
inâ€Â a Company Material Adverse Effect; and (iii) purported failure to comply with
the  ordinary  course  covenant by  terminating certain  employees,  slowing hiring,
and failing to retain key personnel.  Ex. 3.
125. These accusations are pretextual and have no merit.
A.
Twitter has not breached its information-sharing or
cooperation covenants
126. Twitter has  provided  defendants  far more  information  than  they  are
entitled to under the merger agreement.  Section 6.4 serves the narrow purpose of
giving Parent reasonable access to information necessary to close the merger.  It
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does not give defendants a broad right to conduct post-signing due diligence of a
kind they specifically forswore pre-signing.  Much less does it give Musk the right
to hunt for evidence supporting a bogus misrepresentation theory developed to try
to torpedo the deal.
127. In  any  event,  Twitter  has  bent  over  backwards to  provide  Musk  the
information he has requested, including, most notably, the full “firehoseâ€Â data set
that  he  has  been  mining  for  weeks  — and  has  been  continuing  to  mine  since
purporting  to  terminate  — with  the  assistance  of undisclosed data  reviewers.
Twitter  has  also  spent  weeks  and  dedicated  considerable  resources  to  compiling
information responsive to Musk’s numerous other requests for custom reporting of
user data.  Musk and his representatives have received extensive data underlying
Twitter’s process for estimating false or spam accounts as a percentage of mDAU,
including the granular monthly reporting identifying each of the sampled accounts
by “user idâ€Â and the determination as to whether the account was false or spam,
along with the calculations supporting Twitter’s estimates, going back to January
1, 2021.
128. In  their  termination  notice,  defendants  list  categories  of  information
they  claim  Twitter  has  withheld.    Most  of  this information  does  not  exist,  has
already been provided, or is the subject of requests only made recently, in response
to  which  Twitter  had  been  yet  again  compiling  responsive  information  when  it
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received the termination notice.  All of this information sweeps far beyond what is
reasonably necessary to close the merger.  Defendants also complain about rate and
query limits initially accompanying the firehose data.  But those limits were part of
the customary commercial terms defendants initially requested, and, as defendants
acknowledge,  Twitter  increased the  limits immediately  upon  request before  the
purported termination.
129. As  to  Twitter’s  cooperation obligation  under Section  6.11,  the
company has again gone well beyond what is required.  The point of this provision
is  to  assist  Parent  in  furnishing  the  lenders and  underwriters with  information  to
facilitate syndication of the already-committed financing.  Twitter is not obligated
to provide financial information not already in existence, or to provide copies of its
bankers’ valuation models, which are outside the company’s control. Parent, not
Twitter, is responsible for providing the “prospects, projections and plans for the
business and operations of†the company.  Ex. 1 § 6.11.
130. Even so, in response to the request defendants lodged for the first time
on  June  17,  Twitter  made  the  extraordinary  ask  of  its  bankers to  give  Musk  the
final board deck they presented in connection with the merger.  It furnished Musk
with  other  financial  information  he  requested.    It  did  so  even  though  Musk  has
cited no demand from any lender — and no reason related to any obligation under
any  relevant  contract — that  would  support  these  requests.  There  has  been  no
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breach,  and  there  would  be  none  even  if  the  state  of  Twitter’s  cooperation
remained the same at the end of the cure period.
B.
Twitter’s representations in its SEC filings supply no basis
for termination
131. Nor can defendants show that Twitter has made any representation or
collection of representations the inaccuracy of which is “reasonably likely to result
inâ€Â a Company Material Adverse Effect. They do not even try.  Notwithstanding
that  defendants  have received  mountains  of  information  regarding  Twitter’s
processes, far beyond what they are entitled to under the merger agreement, their
termination  notice  asserts only  that  “[p]reliminary  analysis  by  Mr.  Musk’s
advisorsâ€Â of the vast data set Twitter provided to Musk after signing “causes Mr.
Musk to strongly believe†Twitter’s reported estimates have been inaccurate.  Ex. 3
at 6.  Musk’s claimed “belie[f]â€Â is of course no proof of misrepresentation, much
less of a Company Material Adverse Effect — which can be established only by
clearing an extraordinarily high bar that is nowhere in sight here.
C.
Twitter did not breach the ordinary course covenant
132. Having unreasonably withheld consent to programs designed to retain
key personnel, Musk now claims that Twitter breached Section 6.1 by terminating
some employees and failing to retain others who wished to leave.  Like the others,
this claim is meritless and contrived.
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133. While erring on the side of seeking consent, Twitter has continued to
operate in the ordinary course respecting routine management decisions, including
decisions  concerning  termination  and  hiring  of  individual  employees.    In  early
May, Twitter let go of two executives and announced it would be “pausing most
hiring and backfillsâ€Â as positions became vacant.  Musk’s counsel was notified of
those decisions at the time and raised no objection.
134. Consistent  with  its  hiring  slowdown,  Twitter  announced  on  July  7,
2022 that it was reducing its recruiting staff — a small segment of Twitter’s total
employee base — by about 30%.
135. These decisions aligned with Musk’s own stated priorities.  Days after
signing, on April 28, 2022, Musk texted Twitter’s board chair to say his “biggest
concern  is  headcount  and  expense  growth.â€Â    In  a  meeting  with  Twitter
management on May 6, 2022, Musk again asserted that the company’s headcount
was  high  and  encouraged  management  to  consider  ways  to  cut  costs.    Musk
repeated  these  themes  in  conversations  with  Agrawal  and  Segal throughout  May
and  June.    On  June  16,  Musk  held  a  virtual  meeting  with  Twitter  employees.
Asked  what  he  was  “thinking  about  layoffs  at  Twitter,â€Â  Musk  responded  that
“costs  exceed  the  revenue,â€Â  “so  there  would  have  to  be  some  rationalization  of
headcount and expenses.â€Â  In his final conversation with Segal before purporting to
terminate,  Musk  expressed  his  concern  about  Twitter’s  expenses  and  asked  why
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Twitter  was  not  considering  more  aggressive  cost  cutting.    And, as  noted, Musk
has  refused  to  approve — or  even  discuss  — Twitter’s  proposed  retention
programs for key employees.
136. Twitter  specifically  negotiated  for  the  right  to  terminate  employees,
including  executives,  without  first  having  to  obtain  Musk’s  consent.    Musk  had
notice back in early May of many of the actions about which he now complains for
the  first  time.    He  did  not  object  then  or  at  any  point  prior  to  his  purported
termination notice on July 8, because there was no violation.
D.
Having materially breached the merger agreement,
defendants are contractually barred from terminating
137. The  merger  agreement  provides  that  if  defendants  are  in  material
breach of their own obligations under the merger agreement, they cannot exercise
any termination right they might otherwise have.  Ex. 1 § 8.1(d)(i).
138. As set forth above, defendants materially breached their obligation to
use  their  reasonable  best  efforts  to  complete  the  merger,
id.
§ 6.3(a),  materially
breached the hell-or-high-water covenant requiring them to do all things necessary
to  consummate  and  finalize financing,
id.
§ 6.10(a),  materially  breached  their
obligation  to  provide  Twitter  with  information  regarding  the  status  of  debt
financing,
id.
§ 6.10(d),  materially  breached  their  obligation  to  refrain  from
unreasonably  withholding  consent  to  operational  decisions,
id.
§ 6.1,  materially
breached  their  obligations to  seek  Twitter  consent  to  public  comments  about  the
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deal  and  refrain  from disparaging the  company  or  its  representatives in  Tweets
about the merger,
id.
§ 6.8, and materially breached their obligation not to misuse
confidential information,
id.
§ 6.4.  They therefore cannot terminate the agreement
even assuming they otherwise had such a right.
IX.
After purporting to terminate, Musk keeps violating and confirms his
earlier violations
139. After purporting to terminate the deal, Musk continued to make public
statements  disparaging  Twitter  and  confirming  the  pretextual  nature  of  his  post-
signing conduct.
140. In the early morning of July 11 (Eastern time), Musk posted Tweets
implying  that  his  data  requests  were  never intended  to  make  progress  toward
consummating  the  merger,  but  rather  were  part  of  a  plan  to  force  litigation  in
which Twitter’s information would be publicly disclosed:
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141. For  Musk,  it  would  seem,  Twitter,  the  interests  of  its stockholders,
the transaction Musk agreed to, and the court process to enforce it all constitute an
elaborate joke.
142. Musk  also,  once  again,  publicly  called  for  the  SEC  to  investigate
Twitter’s disclosures regarding false and spam accounts:
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143. Musk’s conduct simply confirms that he wants to escape the binding
contract he freely signed, and to damage Twitter in the process.
X.
Twitter faces irreparable harm absent relief
144. Because  of  defendants’ breaches and  the  uncertainty  they  have
generated,  Twitter  faces irreparable  harm.    Defendants  stipulated  in  the  merger
agreement  that  “irreparable  damage  for  which  monetary  damages,  even  if
available,  would  not  be  an  adequate  remedy  would  occur  in  the  event  that  the
parties hereto do not perform the provisions of this Agreement (including failing to
take such actions as are required of it hereunder to consummate this Agreement) in
accordance with  its specified terms  or  otherwise breach such provisions.â€Â   Ex. 1
§ 9.9(a).
145. The  expected  closing  date  for  the  merger  is  fast  approaching.    The
lone remaining application for regulatory approval is under consideration and the
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parties  have  received  no  indication  of  any  obstacle  on  that  front.    Twitter  is
prepared to schedule a stockholder vote immediately upon clearance by the SEC of
its proxy statement, as early as mid-August.  Defendants must close “no later thanâ€
two business days after satisfaction of the closing conditions.
Id.
§ 2.2.
146. Defendants’  actions  in  derogation  of  the  deal’s  consummation,  and
Musk’s repeated disparagement of Twitter and its personnel, create uncertainty and
delay that harm Twitter and its stockholders and deprive them of their bargained-
for rights.  They also expose Twitter to adverse effects on its business operations,
employees, and stock price.
147. Swift  remedial  action  in  the  form  of  specific  performance  and
injunctive relief is warranted.
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CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract — Specific Performance & Injunction)
148. Twitter repeats and incorporates by reference the allegations above.
149. The merger agreement is a valid and enforceable contract.
150. Twitter  has  fully  performed  all  of  its  obligations  under  the  merger
agreement to date, and is ready, willing, and able to continue so performing.
151. Defendants  have  breached  the  merger  agreement  by,  among  other
things, violating Sections 6.1, 6.3, 6.4, 6.8, and 6.10.
152. In Section 9.9(a), each of the parties agreed that, without posting bond
or other undertaking, the other parties “shall be entitled to an injunction, specific
performance and other equitable relief to prevent breaches of this Agreement and
to  enforce  specifically  the  terms  and  provisions  hereof,  in  addition  to  any  other
remedy to which they are entitled at law or in equity.â€
153. In Section 9.9(b), the parties expressly “acknowledged and agreed that
the Company shall be entitled to specific performance or other equitable remedy to
enforce  Parent  and  Acquisition  Sub’s  obligations  to  cause  the  Equity  Investor  to
fund the Equity Financing, or to enforce the Equity Investor’s obligation to fund
the Equity Financing directly, and to consummate the Closingâ€Â if three conditions
are  met: (i) all of the  conditions set forth in  Section 7.1  and  Section 7.2 have or
will be satisfied at the closing; (ii) the debt financing has been funded or will be
funded at the closing if the equity financing is funded; and (iii) the company has
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confirmed that the closing will occur.
154. All  of  the  conditions  set  forth  in  Sections  7.1  and  7.2  have  been
satisfied or waived, or are expected to be satisfied or waived at the closing, and the
closing  will  occur  if  the  debt  and  equity  financing  are  funded,  which  funding  is
solely within the control of defendants.
155. Twitter has suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm as a
result of defendants’ breaches.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE
, Twitter respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment
and relief against defendants, as follows:
A.
Granting all relief requested in this complaint to the extent permitted
under the merger agreement;
B.
Ordering  defendants  to  specifically  perform  their  obligations  under
the merger agreement and consummate the closing in accordance with
the terms of the merger agreement; and
C.
Granting such injunctive relief as is necessary to enforce the decree of
specific performance.
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OF COUNSEL:
William Savitt
Bradley R. Wilson
Sarah K. Eddy
Ryan A. McLeod (No. 5038)
Anitha Reddy
WACHTELL, LIPTON,
ROSENÂ & KATZ
51 West 52nd Street
New York, NY Â 10019
(212) 403-1000
Brad D. Sorrels (No. 5233)
WILSONÂ SONSINI GOODRICH &
ROSATI, P.C.
222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 800
Wilmington, DE Â 19801
(302) 304-7600
Dated:  July 12, 2022
POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP
By:
/s/ Peter J. Walsh, Jr.
Peter J. Walsh, Jr. (No. 2437)
Kevin R. Shannon (No. 3137)
Christopher N. Kelly (No. 5717)
Mathew A. Golden (No. 6035)
1313 North Market Street
Hercules Plaza, 6th Floor
Wilmington, DE Â 19801
(302) 984-6000
Attorneys for Plaintiff Twitter, Inc.
PDF Form Of Complaint