Jane Doe SSS 14-18 v. Uber Inc

Jane Doe SSS 14-18 v. Uber Inc

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. Uber’s Sexual Assault Problem Started at the Top

30. Uber is a transportation company. One of its founders, Travis Kalanick, became its second chief executive officer and, at one time, its largest shareholder. Uber drivers and Uber split the fare Uber charges riders for the riders’ trips.
31. In 2014, Uber’s executives in San Francisco started charging Uber passengers an extra $1 fee for each trip. Uber called this a Safe Rides Fee. When Uber announced the Safe Rides Fee, it told the public that the “[f]ee supports our continued efforts to ensure the safest possible platform for Uber riders and drivers, including an industry-leading background check process, regular motor vehicle checks, driver safety education, development of safety features in the app, and insurance.” The Safe Rides Fee was not split with drivers. So it was pure revenue for Uber. Uber gave hundreds of millions of rides with the Safe Ride Fee attached to them and made hundreds of millions in revenue from the fee. But it never earmarked the money for improving safety or spent it on safety. Instead, it pocketed the money it told the world it was going to directly towards enhancing safety. As a former Uber employee said “[w]e boosted our margins saying our rides were safer.” It “was obscene.”
32. Rider safety was never Uber’s concern. Growth was. To increase growth, which required not only new riders, but new drivers, Travis Kalanick and the executives at Uber made it as easy as possible for Uber drivers to sign up. They used a background-check system designed to get drivers approved as quickly and conveniently as possible. Uber hired Hirease, Inc. to do its background checks. Hirease brags that it can vet drivers within 36 hours. To have such a short turnaround, Uber eschewed industry standards used by other taxi companies and livery services. For example, it abandoned fingerprinting — which takes weeks — and running applicant drivers against private databases, such as FBI records. These shortcuts might have led to growth for Uber, but they also put people, including Plaintiffs, in danger. Indeed, Uber was so fixated on growth that it began mailing cell phones to applicant drivers, so they could begin driving, before Uber’s cursory background check was even complete.
33. Travis Kalanick made the decision that Uber was not going to fingerprint its drivers and that it was not going to scrub applicant drivers against FBI records. Rather, the decision was made to use a fast and shallow background check process.
34. Travis Kalanick also made the decision not to interview drivers or train drivers to ensure Uber’s drivers understood their responsibilities and what was appropriate and inappropriate when interacting with passengers. Mr. Kalanick decided not to implement policies to protect passengers from sexual assault—policies such a zero-tolerance policy with respect to fraternizing or making sexual advances towards passengers, and most certainly with respect to sleeping with or touching the passengers they pick up in a sexual manner.
35. Mr. Kalanick had actual knowledge that these decisions would put passengers in greater danger. As such, he acted with conscious disregard for the rights and safety of female passengers, including Plaintiffs named herein.
36. Travis Kalanick intentionally performed the act of hiring drivers without fingerprinting them, without running them through the FBI databases, and using fast and or shallow background checks. When he took these actions, he knew or should have known that it was highly probable that harm would result. When Uber’s current Chief Executive Officer, Dara Khosrowshahi, took over as Uber’s top executive in August 2017, he continued the policy of hiring drivers without biometric fingerprinting to be run through the FBI database. This was a very intentional and thought-out decision, evidenced by Uber’s active lobbying and resistance against municipalities or regulatory bodies implementing any kind of biometric fingerprinting requirement for drivers.
37. Uber’s greed and complete disregard for rider safety or the rule of law is breathtaking. Uber’s policy is that it will not report any criminal activity it learns of to law- enforcement authorities. That includes allegations of sexual assault. Thus, Uber’s policy is that if it learns from an Uber rider, such as Plaintiff, that she was sexually assaulted, Uber will not report this sexual assault to law enforcement. Uber is proud of this policy and feels “very strongly” that it is not Uber’s job to go to the to the police on behalf of customers when an Uber driver rapes an Uber passenger.
38. This policy has been supported by Uber’s current Chief Executive Officer, Dara Khosrowshahi. When he took the action of intentionally embracing this policy, he knew or should have known that it was highly probable that harm would result. After all, drivers will feel less constrained to commit sexual assault if they know it is less likely that law enforcement will be informed.
39. Uber’s greed, parochial focus on growth, and misogyny has had tragic consequences. In December 2014, a 26-year-old finance worker hailed an Uber to take her home from a work dinner near New Delhi, India. When she fell asleep in the car, her Uber driver moved to the backseat and raped her. The driver had previously been detained for rape. The rape caused an international imbroglio and New Delhi temporarily banned Uber. Uber dealt with the situation by attacking the victim.
40. Eric Alexander was president of Uber in the Asia–Pacific region; he was Uber’s “number three” and Kalanick’s fixer. He secured, possibly illegally, the New Delhi rape victim’s medical records through a law firm. The records contained the medical examination that doctors performed within hours of her rape. Alexander shared these records with Mr. Kalanick and Uber’s number two at the time, Emil Michael. Many other Uber executives here in San Francisco either saw the records or learned of them. Mr. Kalanick latched on to the fact that the victim’s hymen was still intact. (This despite two people pointing out to him that the victim could have been anally raped.) He began cultivating and sharing a bizarre conspiracy that the woman was not raped; the whole incident was a plot against Uber by Olga, Uber’s major ride-sharing competitor in India. No matter that the Uber driver had a history of sexual assault and had confessed the assault to police.
41. Mr. Kalanick and Uber’s leadership and board were the fountainhead of Uber’s culture of reckless growth, misogyny, and lawlessness. When Uber customers accused Uber drivers of sexual assault, something that happened with increasing frequency as Uber grew — given its lax supervision and shoddy background checks — Mr. Kalanick would pace around Uber headquarters, not wondering about how to improve rider safety but repeating the bromide, legally correct but a bromide nonetheless, “innocent until proven guilty.” When law enforcement decided not to bring criminal charges against an Uber driver accused of sexual assault because it felt it did not have enough evidence for a criminal conviction, “a round of cheers would ring out across the fifth floor of Uber HQ.”
42. At a cocktail and dinner party with journalists in New York City, Mr. Michael attacked journalists who criticized Uber. He was particularly angry with Sarah Lacy who had, in a recent story, accused Uber of “sexism and misogyny” and had said she was going to delete her Uber app because she feared for her safety because of Uber’s drivers. Mr. Michael said that if any woman deleted her Uber app because of Ms. Lacy’s story and was sexually assaulted, Ms. Lacy “Should be held personally responsible.”
43. The actions of Uber’s executives and board members demonstrate Uber’s contempt for women and myopic focus on profits. Uber only cares about growth. This culture permeates the entire company and endangers Uber’s female riders. Sarah Fowler wrote an explosive blog post, describing how pervasive this culture was at Uber. Ms. Fowler was hired by Uber as a site- reliability engineer in 2016. On her first day on the job, post-training, her manager sent her a message over the Uber chat system. He said that he “was in an open relationship . . . and his girlfriend was having an easy time finding new partners, but he wasn’t. He was trying to stay out of trouble at work, he said, but he couldn’t help getting in trouble, because he was looking for women to have sex with.” Ms. Fowler felt it “was clear that he was trying to get [her] to have sex with him, and it was so clearly out of line that [she] immediately took screenshots of [the] chat messages and reported him to” Human Resources. Uber uman Resources and “upper management” told her that “even though this was clearly sexual harassment, and he was propositioning [her], it was this man’s first offense, and that they wouldn’t feel comfortable giving him anything other than a warning and a stern talking-to. Upper management told her that her manager “was a high performer,” so “they wouldn’t feel comfortable punishing him for what was probably just an innocent mistake on his part.” Upper management told Ms. Fowler that she had two choices, join a new Uber team, or stay on her team, under the manager who propositioned her, but she “would have to understand that [the manager] would most likely give [her] a poor performance review when review time came around, and there was nothing [Human Resources] could do about that.” She was told that by Human Resources that if she chose to stick with the team she was on, that a poor review by her then manger wouldn’t be retaliation because she had “been given an option.” Because working under a harassing manager was untenable to Ms. Fowler, she chose to switch teams. She eventually learned, by talking to other women employees at Uber, that many of them had similar sexual-harassment stories and that the manager who sexually harassed her had sexually harassed others before he sexually harassed her. That is, she learned that Human Resources and upper management had been mendacious with her. “Within a few months, [the harasser] was reported once again for inappropriate behavior, and those who reported him were told it was still his ‘first offense.’ The situation was escalated as far up the chain as it could be escalated, and still nothing was done” by Uber.
44. With the bad press Uber was getting because of the sexual assaults, Mr. Michael’s comments, and the Sarah Fowler affair, Uber realized it needed to appear that it was making changes and trying to eradicate its toxic-male culture, so it held a company-wide meeting to announce changes. At the meeting, when Uber announced that it was going to increase its diversity and sensitivity by adding a female board member, David Bonderman, another Uber board member, chimed in, announcing to the company that the addition of a woman to the board meant “it’s much likelier [there will] be more talking on the board.” Uber’s “culture was poisoned from the very top.” Indeed, John William Gurley was a longtime board member of Uber and a close confidant of Mr. Kalanick. He sat on his hands and watched silently as Uber put in place a culture and policies that have hurt many innocent women, including Plaintiffs.
45. In an attempt to buff its tarnished reputation, Uber also hired former Attorney General Eric Holder and his law firm, Covington & Burling LLP, to investigate Uber’s culture and work-place environment.
46. During his investigation, as detailed in the publicly released “Holder Report,” Attorney General Holder uncovered “a winding, repetitive list of infractions that had occurred across hundreds of global offices, including sexual assault and physical violence.”
47. Uber’s sexual-assault and harassment problems have become so big and so public that it has made pale and perfunctory attempts to act as though it is trying to confront them. In May 2018, Uber acknowledged its “deeply rooted problem” of sexual assault. It proclaimed it was committed to solving the problem, stating that “we’re making some important changes today.” Included in these “important changes” was Uber’s promise to publish a “safety transparency report that will include data on sexual assaults . . . that occur on the Uber platform.”
48. Despite these promises, no data on sexual assaults for another year and a half.
49. When Uber finally released the report in December 2019, it was forced to acknowledge that in 2018 alone there were 3,045 sexual assaults in the United States during Uber trips — 235 sexual assaults of the “most serious kind.”
50. Uber has not publicly disclosed any sexual assault data since that December 2019 report. Tony West, Uber’s chief legal officer since October 2017 made, and continues to make, the decision of whether and when to release sexual assault data following Uber’s acknowledgement of its deeply rooted sexual assault problem. Mr. West continues to withhold the data that would alert Uber passengers and the public to the fact that sexual assaults by Uber drivers continue to occur at an unacceptable and alarming rate.
51. Uber became aware of its sexual assault problem long before it released the Holder report. Uber’s operations team “dealt with thousands of misconduct cases every year, including instances of sexual assault.”
52. Uber “had so lowered the bar to become a driver that people who might have been prevented from driving in the official taxi industry could easily join Uber.”
53. As described earlier, these decisions to lower the bar were made by Travis Kalanick and other officers, directors, and managing agents.
54. But it was not that Uber simply lowered the bar. It failed to take adequate steps to make its rides safe; it failed to provide everything necessary for safe transportation of its passengers. For example, Uber failed to install video cameras in the cars. Such a step would have chilled the wantonness of potential predators. It failed to provide an option in the Uber App that allowed female riders to select to be driven by female drivers. And it failed to adopt adequate training of its drivers on issues of sexual assault and sexual harassment. That is, it failed to provide adequately trained drivers. These policies to fail to make its rides safe were put in place by Travis Kalanick and other officers, directors, and managing agents of Uber.
55. Mr. Kalanick’s successor, Dara Khosrowshahi, continued the policy of not requiring third-party operated cameras in Uber vehicles.
56. Mr. Kalanick, Mr. Khosrowshahi, and other officers, directors, and managing agents of Uber knew that if they put cameras in cars less sexual assaults during Uber rides would occur. They knew that if they provided an option that would allow female passengers to choose to be driven by female drivers, fewer sexual assaults during rides would occur. They knew that if they better trained their drivers in sexual-assault prevention, less sexual assaults would occur during Uber rides. They intentionally refused to put these safety policies in place with actual and constructive knowledge that not putting these policies in place made it highly probable that harm to female Uber passengers would result.
57. Uber’s response to the driver sexual assaults that were reported to the company also evidenced the conscious disregard of Uber executives, including Mr. Kalanick and Mr. Khosrowshahi. A 2019 Washington Post investigative piece revealed Uber maintained a three strikes policy for its drivers. Investigators hired by Uber to investigate the more serious passenger complaints about drivers, such as drug use, physical violence, and sexual assault reported, “A driver would only be deactivated under three circumstances: 1) if it was the second or third reported offense; 2) if there is corroborative evidence like video or a police report; 3) if the driver admits to the assault.” Even with a three-strikes policy, Uber executives would make exceptions to keep dangerous drivers on the road. “For instance, a New York-area driver allegedly made three separate sexual advances on riders, said an investigator assigned to the case. After an executive overruled the investigator, the driver was allowe to continue working until a fourth incident, when a rider claimed he raped her.”
58. As Uber became more popular, more people realized Uber had so lowered the bar that people with checkered backgrounds could drive for Uber. People also realized that Uber had not provided everything necessary for safe rides, that is, everything that might make it more difficult to get away with sexual assaults, like video cameras in cars. In addition, they recognized Uber was at the same time marketing itself to women as a safe mode of transportation, including after drinking. Because of these factors, Uber became a magnet for sexual predators — men who knew that driving for Uber meant they would get to drive around intoxicated women late at night. These men started sexually assaulting women at alarming rates, as the Holder Report shows. And, as stated earlier, Uber and its officers, directors, and managing agents — including Travis Kalanick — had actual knowledge that these sexual assaults were going on, on the platform and women were being hurt. But they did nothing. They failed to start screening drivers better and failed to place video cameras in cars. They intentionally refused to implement these safety measures despite actual knowledge of the problem, and these officers, directors, and managing agents — including Travis Kalanick — had actual or constructive knowledge that refusing to do so meant there was a high probability that more female passengers would be harmed, which is what ended up happening to Plaintiffs.

B. The Attack on Plaintiffs

59. This suit arises from the serious harm Plaintiffs suffered (set forth in more detail below) as a result of the wrongful acts and omissions of Defendants.
60. Jane Doe SSS 14
61. On or about February 11, 2022, Plaintiff Jane Doe SSS 14 (“SSS 14”) requested an Uber through the Uber App in Chino Hills, California to take her safely to her destination. Rather than drive SSS 14 safely to her destination, the Uber driver drove around in circles, parked his vehicle and began sexually assaulting SSS 14 by placing his hands up Plaintiff’s dress to fondle and digitally penetrated her vagina while attempting to rape SSS 14. This disgusting and depraved attack by the Uber Driver humiliated, violated, and robbed SSS 14 of her dignity and personal safety.
62. By failing to take reasonable steps to confront the problem of multiple rapes and sexual assaults of Uber passengers by Uber drivers, Uber has acted in conscious disregard of the safety of its passengers, including SSS 14, has breached its duty of reasonable care, and has breached the implied and express covenants arising from its contract with its passengers.
63. The Uber driver who perpetrated the above-described assault, sexual assault, and/or attack on SSS 14 in the course and scope of his employment with Uber and while he was still under Uber’s direction and control. These acts caused Plaintiff pain and suffering that persists to this day.
64. The Uber driver was acting on behalf of, for the benefit of, at the direction of, and within the course and scope of employment with Uber and engagement by Uber. Uber provided the Uber driver with access to its ride-sharing app platform, a tool necessary for Uber drivers to perform the work Uber assigned. Uber, through the Uber App, directed the Uber driver regarding the location of the pickup, time of the pickup, and routes for both the pickup of Plaintiff and transportation to her destination, and much more, as discussed below.
65. The Uber driver who assaulted SSS 14 was an agent or employee of Uber, which is a common carrier. His duties were directed at the comfort and protection of passengers in his car, including SSS 14.
66. Uber derived a monetary benefit from every ride assigned to said Uber driver through its app, including the Plaintiff’s ride during which she was sexually harassed, sexually battered, and sexually assaulted.
67. Jane Doe SSS 15
68. On or about November 13, 2021, Plaintiff Jane Doe SSS 15 (“SSS 15”) requested an Uber through the Uber App in Perris, California to take her to her destination in Corona, California. Rather than drive SSS 15 safely to her destination, the Uber driver drove SSS 15 to a location, stopped the vehicle, entered the back seat of the vehicle, and fondled SSS 15’s breasts before overpowering her SSS 15 and raping her. This disgusting and depraved attack humiliated, degraded, violated, and robbed SSS 15 of her dignity and personal safety.
69. By failing to take reasonable steps to confront the problem of multiple rapes and sexual assaults of Uber passengers by Uber drivers, Uber has acted in conscious disregard of the safety of its passengers, including SSS 15, has breached its duty of reasonable care, and has breached the implied and express covenants arising from its contract with its passengers.
70. The Uber driver who perpetrated the above-described incident, assault, sexual assault, and/or attack on SSS 15 in the course and scope of his employment with Uber and while he was still under Uber’s direction and control. These acts caused Plaintiff pain and suffering that persists to this day.
71. The Uber driver was acting on behalf of, for the benefit of, at the direction of, and within the course and scope of employment with Uber and engagement by Uber. Uber provided the Uber driver with access to its ride-sharing app platform, a tool necessary for Uber drivers to perform the work Uber assigned. Uber, through the Uber App, directed the Uber driver regarding the location of the pickup, time of the pickup, and routes for both the pickup of Plaintiff and transportation to her destination, and much more, as discussed below.
72. The Uber driver whose actions resulted in SSS 15 being sexually harassed, sexually and/or sexually assaulted was an agent or employee of Uber, which is a common carrier. His duties were directed at the comfort and protection of passengers in his car, including SSS 15.
73. Uber derived a monetary benefit from every ride assigned to said Uber driver through its app, including SSS 15, the Plaintiff’s ride where she was sexually harassed and/or sexually assaulted.
74. Jane Doe SSS 16
75. On or about June 6, 2022, Plaintiff Jane Doe SSS 16 (“SSS 16”) requested an Uber through the Uber app to take her to her destination safely. Rather than drive SSS 16 safely to her destination, the Uber driver picked up SSS 16, convinced her to sit in the front seat, and drove her to her destination where Uber driver parked the vehicle and proceeded to forcefully fondle and kiss her and pulled down her pants to digitally penetrate and batter SSS 16. This disgusting and depraved attack frightened, humiliated, degraded, violated, and robbed SSS 16 of her dignity and personal safety.
76. By failing to take reasonable steps to confront the problem of multiple rapes and sexual assaults of Uber passengers by Uber drivers, Uber has acted in conscious disregard of the safety of its passengers, including SSS 16 has breached its duty of reasonable care, and has breached the implied and express covenants arising from its contract with its passengers.
77. The Uber driver who perpetrated the above-described assault, sexual assault, and/or attack on SSS 16 in the course and scope of his employment with Uber and while he was still under Uber’s direction and control. These acts caused Plaintiff pain and suffering that persists to this day.
78. The Uber driver was acting on behalf of, for the benefit of, at the direction of, and within the course and scope of employment with Uber and engagement by Uber. Uber provided the Uber driver with access to its ride-sharing app platform, a tool necessary for Uber drivers to perform the work Uber assigned. Uber, through the Uber App, directed the Uber driver regarding the location of the pickup, time of the pickup, and routes for both the pickup of Plaintiff and transportation to her destination, and much more, as discussed below.
79. The Uber driver who assaulted SSS 16 was an agent or employee of Uber, which is a common carrier. His duties were directed at the comfort and protection of passengers in his car, including SSS 16.
80. Uber derived a monetary benefit from every ride assigned to said Uber driver through its app, including the Plaintiff’s ride during which she was sexually harassed and/or sexually assaulted.
81. Jane Doe SSS 17
82. On or about October 1, 2021, Plaintiff Jane Doe SSS 17 (“SSS 17”) ordered an Uber through the Uber app to take SSS 17 to her destination safely. Rather than take Plaintiff safely to her destination, the Uber driver began masturbating in the driver’s seat while SSS 17 sat in the passenger seat and proceeded to force SSS 17’s to perform oral sex on Uber driver while Uber driver held down SSS 17’s head. Uber driver then digitally penetrated SSS 17. This depraved and disgusting attack frightened, humiliated, degraded, violated, and robbed SSS 17 of her dignity and personal safety.
83. By failing to take reasonable steps to confront the problem of multiple rapes and sexual assaults of Uber passengers by Uber drivers, Uber has acted in conscious disregard of the safety of its passengers, including SSS 17, has breached its duty of reasonable care, and has breached the implied and express covenants arising from its contract with its passengers.
84. The Uber driver who perpetrated the above-described assault, sexual assault, and/or attack on SSS 17 in the course and scope of his employment with Uber and while he was still under Uber’s direction and control. These acts caused Plaintiff pain and suffering that persists to this day.
85. The Uber driver was acting on behalf of, for the benefit of, at the direction of, and within the course and scope of employment with Uber and engagement by Uber. Uber provided the Uber driver with access to its ride-sharing app platform, a tool necessary for Uber drivers to perform the work Uber assigned. Uber, through the Uber App, directed the Uber driver regarding the location of the pickup, time of the pickup, and routes for both the pickup of Plaintiff and transportation to her destination, and much more, as discussed below.
86. The Uber driver who assaulted SSS 17 was an agent or employee of Uber, which is a common carrier. His duties were directed at the comfort and protection of passengers in his car, including SSS 1.
87. Uber derived a monetary benefit from every ride assigned to said Uber driver through its app, including the Plaintiff’s ride during which she was sexually harassed and/or sexually assaulted.
88. Jane Doe SSS 18
89. In or around September 18, 2021, Plaintiff Jane Doe SSS 18 (“SSS 18”) ordered an Uber through the Uber app to take SSS 18 to her destination safely. Rather than drive SSS 18 safely to her destination, the Uber driver began driving SSS 18 to her destination, stopped the vehicle, and began fondling SSS 18’s thighs while placing his hands on her neck to kiss her while attempting to digitally penetrate and rape her. This disgusting and depraved attack frightened, humiliated, degraded, violated, and robbed SSS 18 of her dignity and personal safety.
90. Rather than take Plaintiff safely to her destination, the Uber driver attempted to rape SSS 18. This depraved and disgusting attack frightened, humiliated, degraded, violated, and robbed SSS 18 of her dignity and personal safety.
91. By failing to take reasonable steps to confront the problem of multiple rapes and sexual assaults of Uber passengers by Uber drivers, Uber has acted in conscious disregard of the safety of its passengers, including SSS 18, has breached its duty of reasonable care, and has breached the implied and express covenants arising from its contract with its passengers.
92. The Uber driver who perpetrated the above-described assault, sexual assault, and/or attack on SSS 18 in the course and scope of his employment with Uber and while he was still under Uber’s direction and control. These acts caused Plaintiff pain and suffering that persists to this day.
93. The Uber driver was acting on behalf of, for the benefit of, at the direction of, and within the course and scope of employment with Uber and engagement by Uber. Uber provided the Uber driver with access to its ride-sharing app platform, a tool necessary for Uber drivers to perform the work Uber assigned. Uber, through the Uber App, directed the Uber driver regarding the location of the pickup, time of the pickup, and routes for both the pickup of Plaintiff and transportation to her destination, and much more, as discussed below.
94. The Uber driver who assaulted SSS 18 was an agent or employee of Uber, which is a common carrier. His duties were directed at the comfort and protection of passengers in his car, including SSS 18.
95. Uber derived a monetary benefit from every ride assigned to said Uber driver through its app, including the Plaintiff’s ride during which she was sexually harassed and/or sexually assaulted.

C. Uber

91. Uber is a transportation company. Its core business is providing transportation to the public at large through its network of drivers. It connects its drivers to the public through the Uber App. Anyone from the public may download the Uber App for free. Using the app, a customer may request a ride from one of Uber’s drivers for a standardized charge unilaterally set by Uber. Uber directs its drivers to pick up the passengers and transport them to their destinations.
92. Uber provides transportation through a digital application made available to the general public for the purpose of transporting its users, the passengers, from place to place for profit. Uber has widely offered its services to the general public and charges standard fees for its services through its application. Uber does not allow discrimination against passengers on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, gender, gender identity, physical or mental disability, medical condition, marital status, age, or sexual orientation. Any member of the public can use Uber’s services for transportation.
93. Uber is a common carrier under California Civil Code § 2168 and the common law. Uber holds itself out to the public generally and indifferently to transport persons from place to place for profit. As a common carrier, Uber owes its passengers, including the Plaintiffs named herein, a heightened duty of care, under both the common law and California Civil Code § 2100. Uber has an affirmative duty to protect its passengers from assault by one of its employees or contractors and is liable for its employees’ or agents’ assaults, regardless of whether such acts were committed within the course and scope of employment for Uber.
94. Given the heightened duty Uber has as a common carrier, to the extent it failed or refused to implement procedures, policies, and app functions that it knew or should have known would prevent assaults such as those suffered by Plaintiffs, as Plaintiffs have alleged herein, Uber is liable for the above-described tortious acts of its drivers, which caused harm to Plaintiffs.
95. Further, the heightened duty Uber has as a common carrier is a non-delegable duty. Under the common law, Uber has a non-delegable duty to safely transport its passengers from the place it picks them up to their destination. This duty cannot be delegated to Uber drivers. When an Uber driver assaults a passenger, Uber is liable for the driver’s actions due to its non-delegable duty.
96. Uber drivers are largely nonprofessional, untrained, and use their own vehicles. Uber employs and engages its drivers, including Uber Driver, in traditional at-will relationships, in which: a. Uber has the discretion to fire its drivers for any reason and at any time; that is, Uber maintains the right to discharge its drivers at will, and without cause;
    b. Drivers are not charged a fee by Uber to apply to become employees;
    c. At all times relevant, there was no agreement between Uber and driver designating the driver as an independent contractor;
    d. Drivers are not charged a fee to download the app or to receive notifications from Uber that customers want rides;
    e. Fare prices for rides are set exclusively by Uber;
    f. Drivers have no input on fares charged to consumers;
    g. Drivers are not permitted to negotiate with consumers on fares charged;
    h. Uber can and does modify charges to consumers; for example, if Uber determines that a driver has taken a circuitous route to a destination;
    i. Uber takes a fee of every ride charged to a consumer;
    j. Uber retains control over customer-contact information;
    k. Uber controls its drivers’ contacts with its consumer base and considers its consumer list to be proprietary information;
    l. In some instances, Uber controls the hours a driver works;
    m. Drivers are not permitted to answer passenger inquiries about booking future rides outside of the Uber App;
    n. Driving for Uber is not a specialized skill;
    o. Uber’s business model depends on having a large pool of non-professional drivers;
    p. Drivers must abide by a list of regulations to drive for Uber;
    q. Uber requires its drivers to pick up Uber customers on the correct side of the street;
    r. Uber forbids its drivers from talking on their cell phones while the drivers are driving customers;
    s. Uber tracks drivers’ speed and braking and sends drivers reports based on how many times the driver had to brake hard;
    t. Uber drivers are not allowed to ask Uber customers for their contact information;
    u. Drivers who reject too many ride requests risk facing discipline, including suspension or termination;
    v. Consumers give feedback on rides they have taken, and rate drivers on a scale from one to five stars. These ratings are used by Uber to discipline and terminate drivers; and
    w. Such other acts of control that discovery will show.
97. Uber actively markets itself as a safe company that provides safe rides. Both before 2014 and after, Uber actively and aggressively marketed the supposed safety of its transportation services. These efforts continue to this day, and include email messages sent to every Uber customer, including Plaintiffs.
98. Over the years, Uber has launched a number of marketing campaigns specifically marketing its transportation services to, among others, young women too intoxicated to drive.
99. Uber represented to its customers, including Plaintiffs, on its website all of the following:
    a. “How we help keep you safe – We’re committed to helping you get where you want to go with confidence, whether it’s building emergency features in the app or making it easy for you to check your ride.”
    b. “Ride with confidence – The Uber experience was built with safety in mind. Through incident prevention tools, insurance coverage, and technology that keeps you connected, we’re dedicated to helping you move safely and focus on what matters most.”
    c. “Ride with confidence – Designing a safer ride – driver screenings – All potential drivers in the US must complete a screening before becoming an Uber driver-partner, and current drivers continue to be vetted for criminal offenses.”
    d. “Ride with confidence – Designing a safer ride – On every trip, you can tap a button for safety tools and get help whenever you need it.”
    e. “Ride with confidence – Designing a safer ride – An inclusive community – Through our joint efforts with cities and safety experts and by working together, we’re helping to create safe journeys for everyone.”
    f. “Our commitment to safety – You deserve to be able to move safely. To look forward to the opportunities ahead. To be connected to people and places that matter most. Which is why we’re focused on your safety, from setting new standards to developing technology with the goal of reducing incidents.”
    g. “How safety is built into your experience – Safety features in the app – Tap a button for emergency assistance. Share your trip details with loved ones. Our technology helps put peace of mind at your fingertips.”
    h. “How safety is built into your experience – An inclusive community – Millions of riders and drivers share a set of Community Guidelines, holding each other accountable to do the right thing.”
    i. “How safety is built into your experience – Coverage on every trip – We’ve put insurance from leading companies in place for every ride.”
    j. “Building safer journeys for everyone – Rider safety – Uber driver-partners in the US go through a multi-point screening check for their driving and criminal history before they are authorized to take trips through the app. Every rider has access to safety features built into the app and a support team if you need them.”
    k. “The future of safety – More than 200 Uber employees, from researchers and scientists to designers and engineers, are focused on building technology that puts safety at the heart of your experience.”
    l. “Safe rides around the clock – Affordable, reliable transportation can help make roads safer. Need a late-night ride and can’t drive yourself? Request a ride with Uber.”
100. Uber actively and publicly markets its transportation services to be safe and reliable services.
101. Uber has cultivated an image among its customers of safety and superiority to public transportation and traditional taxis. Because of aggressive marketing, most Uber customers are generally unaware of the real risks associated with Uber rides and continue to believe a ride with Uber is a safer and better alternative.
102. In 2016, Uber agreed to pay $28.5 million to settle a class action lawsuit over its fraudulent marketing of its security screening as “industry-leading.”
103. Riders, including Plaintiffs, reasonably rely on Uber’s representations and promises regarding safety and security measures. Riders, including Plaintiffs, choose to ride with Uber as a result of this reliance.
104. Uber markets its ride hailing service to female riders as a safer alternative to traditional taxis.
105. Uber advertised, “driving change for women’s safety” on its website to specifically represent and promote women’s safety while using Uber, which states “[s]exual assault and gender- based violence don’t belong anywhere in our communities, which is why Uber is committed to help stop incidents before they happen”.
106. In 2015, Uber released a report with Mothers Against Drunk Driving “MADD” that states “The Uber App was created to ensure reliable access to safe rides.” The report states that with Uber, intoxicated persons can find “a safe, reliable ride home” that is “always within reach.”
107. The safe image that Uber aggressively cultivates suggests to customers, including Plaintiff, which riding while intoxicated with Uber is safe. Uber does not inform riders, like Plaintiffs, that hailing a ride after drinking puts riders in peril from the drivers themselves. By marketing heavily to young women who have been drinking, and promising safe rides, Uber puts riders in peril.
108. Uber knew its representations and promises about rider safety were false and misleading yet continued to allow riders to believe in the truth of these representations and promises and continued to profit from riders’ reliance on those representations and promises.
109. Unfortunately, an Uber driver sexually assaulting a passenger is not an isolated or rare occurrence. A safety report Uber released in December 2019, showed there were thousands of sexual assaults during Uber rides in 2018 alone. Tony West, Uber’s Chief Legal Officer, said in response to that report, the “numbers are jarring and hard to digest.”
110. Uber employs a vast network of drivers. But, at all relevant times, Uber provided its drivers with inadequate training regarding sexual assault, sexual relations, sexually inappropriate behavior, sensitivity, and customer relations.
111. Uber has also provided inadequate background checks and screening of its drivers. Among other things, it does not fingerprint its drivers, it does not run the applicant drivers against all available public databases, and it does not do international background checks.
112. Uber lobbies state and local governments to limit what is required of Uber with respect to driver background checks. Uber also lobbies local government entities to continue allowing Uber to perform its own background checks of its driver applicants, rather than municipalities performing the more stringent screening they do for traditional taxi drivers.
113. Uber has successfully persuaded lawmakers in several states, including California, to keep background check requirements for its drivers limited.
114. As a direct result of Uber’s lobbying efforts, those entities largely self-enforce hiring standards for their drivers. Whereas, in cities where municipalities perform the screening, such as in Houston, Texas and Seattle Washington, hundreds of driver applicants Uber approved are ultimately rejected by the municipality.
115. Even where authorized to do so, Uber generally does not perform driver background checks and instead outsource the checks to a third-party vendor that often limits the extent of its background check and that does not verify the information provided by the applicant is accurate or complete. The turnaround time for an Uber background check is often under 36 hours.
116. The application process to become an Uber driver is simple, fast, and designed to allow the company to hire as many drivers as possible while incurring minimal associated costs. Uber fought for and implemented a less robust hiring process knowing it would be at the expense of passenger safety.
117. Although Uber claims its drivers are not employees, Uber engages its drivers as part of its business and the Uber drivers are charged with the responsibility of safely transporting Uber passengers to their destination.
118. Unfortunately, an Uber driver sexually assaulting a passenger is not an isolated or rare occurrence. A safety report Uber released in December 2019, showed there were thousands of sexual assaults during Uber rides in 2018 alone.62 Tony West, Uber’s Chief Legal Officer, said in response to that report, the “numbers are jarring and hard to digest.”63
119. Uber employs a vast network of drivers. But, at all relevant times, Uber provided its drivers with inadequate training regarding sexual assault, sexual relations, sexually inappropriate behavior, sensitivity, and customer relations.
120. Uber has also provided inadequate background checks and screening of its drivers. Among other things, it does not fingerprint its drivers, it does not run the applicant drivers against all available public databases, and it does not do international background checks.
121. Uber lobbies state and local governments to limit what is required of Uber with respect to driver background checks. Uber also lobbies local government entities to continue allowing Uber to perform its own background checks of its driver applicants, rather than municipalities performing the more stringent screening they do for traditional taxi drivers.
122. Uber has successfully persuaded lawmakers in several states, including California, to keep background check requirements for its drivers limited.
123. As a direct result of Uber’s lobbying efforts, those entities largely self-enforce hiring standards for their drivers. Whereas, in cities where municipalities perform the screening, such as in Houston, Texas and Seattle Washington, hundreds of driver applicants Uber approved are ultimately rejected by the municipality.
124. Even where authorized to do so, Uber generally does not perform driver background checks and instead outsource the checks to a third-party vendor that often limits the extent of its background check and that does not verify the information provided by the applicant is accurate or complete. The turnaround time for an Uber background check is often under 36 hours.
125. The application process to become an Uber driver is simple, fast, and designed to allow the company to hire as many drivers as possible while incurring minimal associated costs. Uber fought for and implemented a less robust hiring process knowing it would be at the expense of passenger safety.
126. Although Uber claims its drivers are not employees, Uber engages its drivers as part of its business and the Uber drivers are charged with the responsibility of safely transporting Uber passengers to their destination.

DELAYED DISCOVERY AND FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT

127. The discovery rule applies to toll the running of the statute of limitations until Plaintiffs knew, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have known of the existence of their claim against Uber.
128. Plaintiffs were not aware of the foreseeability of the sexual assault they endured because Uber intentionally concealed the fact that Uber drivers had been regularly sexually assaulting women since at least 2014 and instead represented that Uber was a safe mode of transportation.
129. A reasonable investigation by Plaintiffs at the time of their sexual assault would not have revealed the factual basis of their causes of action against Uber. This is because Uber, through marketing and more, took actions to conceal that its drivers regularly and frequently assaulted women. This is also because Uber has publicly claimed that it does not control its drivers and that its drivers are not Uber employees. As such, despite reasonable diligence, Plaintiffs were unable to discover Uber’s negligent or wrongful conduct, which brought about or contributed to bringing about the sexual assault suffered.
130. Furthermore, the running of any statute of limitations has been equitably tolled by reason of Uber’s intentional representations and fraudulent concealment and conduct.
131. Through its affirmative misrepresentations and omissions, Uber actively concealed from Plaintiffs the true risks associated with using the Uber App and riding in an Uber, specifically, the risk of being kidnapped, sexually assaulted, sexually battered, raped, falsely imprisoned, stalked, harassed, and/or otherwise attacked.
132. As a result of Uber’s actions, Plaintiffs were unaware, and could not reasonably know or have learned through reasonable diligence that Uber could be held liable for the risks its drivers posed as alleged herein and that those risks were the direct and proximate result of Uber’s acts and omissions.
133. Plaintiffs did not learn of Uber’s negligent or wrongful cause in bringing about the sexual assault until after they saw advertisements for legal help, so their claims are not time barred.
134. Furthermore, Uber is estopped from relying on any statute of limitations because of its concealment of the truth about its failure to adequately employ measures to ensure the safety of its passengers. Uber had a duty to disclose the true character, quality and nature of its background checks and the incidence of Uber drivers sexually assaulting or otherwise attacking passengers, because this was non-public information over which Defendants had, and continue to have, exclusive control, and because Defendants knew this information was not available to Plaintiffs, Uber passengers/customers, and/or the general public.